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This symposium was organized following the deaths of twelve West
Virginia coal miners at the Sago mine on January 2, 2006. The stated goal of
the symposium is "to explore and stimulate new ways of examining and solving
a very old problem-the challenge of providing the safest possible workplace
* B.A. from Dickinson College, J.D. George Washington University. The article is dedicated
to my father, C. James Ruffennach, a 1963 graduate of the West Virginia University College of
Law. Special thanks to the West Virginia Law Review, especially Linnsey Evick, T. Matthew
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for American coal miners.' It is certainly a laudable goal. The loss of human
life at Sago, and at other mines in the United States and throughout the world, is
tragic.
Because the symposium was organized by the West Virginia Law Re-
view, its focus is, not surprisingly, on legal solutions to the perceived problem of
coal mine safety. In Part II of the symposium, seven of the eight presenters
were lawyers. In Part I of the symposium, four of the six presenters were law-
yers.
Obviously, lawyers play an essential role in a society based on the rule
of law. But lawyers approach problems very differently than economists, actu-
aries, statisticians, loss control specialists, risk managers, safety professionals,
and mining professionals. Legal solutions, which are often centered on creating
rights and imposing obligations, are not well suited for every type of problem.
To a large extent, the agenda for the symposium replicated the non-
multidisciplinary approach taken by Congress in 1969 with the passage of the
Coal Act, in 1977 with the passage of the Mine Act and in 2006 with the pas-
sage of the MINER Act. In all three instances, Congress looked for and imple-
mented legal solutions to perceived mine safety problems without much, if any,
consideration of alternative approaches.2
To its credit, however, the West Virginia Law Review posed the ques-
tion of whether the problem of coal mine safety is one that can be solved by
laws that are written by lawyers. The title of the symposium, Thinking Outside
the Box, is an unambiguous invitation to reevaluate the "safety through laws"
paradigm that has prevailed in the United States for over thirty-five years.
It is my view,3 based on my professional experience and political per-
spective,4 that the current method of using the federal government's authority to
force compliance with regulations is a misguided way to attempt to improve
coal mine safety.5 While the intentions of the highly credentialed lawyers, aca-
I Anne Marie Lofaso, Approaching Coal Mine Safety from a Comparative Law and Interdis-
ciplinary Perspective, 111 W.VA. L. REv. 1, at 2 (2008).
2 The notable exception was the Mine Safety Tax Relief Act of 2006 proposed by Senator
Rockefeller (D. W. Va.), which created tax incentives for investment in mine safety. Press Re-
lease, Senator Jay Rockefeller, Rockefeller Wins Victory on Mine Safety (Feb. 2, 2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060208045745/rockefeller.senate.gov/news/2006/prO202O6a.htm].
3 The views stated in this article are my personal views. I have not been compensated, in any
way whatsoever, to advocate a free market approach to mine safety. The views contained herein
do not represent the views of any of my current or former clients.
4 I am an attorney that represents mine operators in disputes with the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) that arise under the Mine Act. Politically, I aspire to the principles of the
American Revolution-individual liberty, limited government, the free market, and the rule of
law.
5 I have previously committed these views to writing in a policy analysis published by the
CATO Institute. See generally C. Gregory Ruffennach, Saving Lives or Wasting Resources? The
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demicians and government officials that are trying to use the forced-compliance
model to make mines safer are beyond reproach, they, like their predecessors in
1969 and 1977, are destined to failure. As the Sago mine disaster exemplifies,
the forced-compliance approach to mine safety is inherently flawed and inter-
feres with many of the free market incentives that actually make mines safer.
I. DISASTERS AND STORMS
It is fair to say that any loss of human life is problematic. In this re-
spect, because about thirty people die each year in the nation's coal mines, there
is a "problem." Every single loss of life is a personal tragedy for the family,
friends, and co-workers of the victim. The "problem" will exist until there are
zero coal mining fatalities.
6
While the coal mining industry in the United States has not yet achieved
zero fatalities, it is important to put the so-called coal mine safety "problem"
into perspective. Obviously, coal mining is not a leading cause of death in the
United States. For example, on one weekend in June of 2008, thirty people on
the East Coast died from heat-related illnesses in their own homes.7
Coal mining is not even the most dangerous occupation in the United
States. For example, in terms of raw numbers, 957 truck drivers died on the job
in 2006.8 The most dangerous occupation on a rated basis is commercial fish-
ing, which has a fatality rate over three times greater than coal mining.9 In
2006, the worst year of the decade in terms of coal mining fatalities, the rate at
which coal miners died on the job was a little more than the fatality rate for gar-
bage collectors and a little less than the fatality rate for iron workers.1°
Although coal mining is one of the more dangerous occupations in
terms of fatal injuries, variation in fatality rates among different industries is not
problematic in and of itself. Certainly, no one expects mining coal to be as safe
as working at Wal-Mart." Wal-Mart employees have the inherent advantage of
working in geologically and atmospherically stable conditions that are above
6 See, e.g., CONSOL ENERGY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 5-6, available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/mediafiles/iroll66/66439/CONSOLAR07.pdf ("We also began our "Absolute Zero" initia-
tive. More than just a new safety slogan, the initiative is a complete restructuring of the way we
manage safety in the company, and a change in the way we think about safety as well.").
7 Posting of Jason Samenow, East Coast Heat Wave Death Toll Over 30 to
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/capitalweathergang/2008/06/east_coast-heatwave-killed-30.ht
ml (June 13, 2008, 10:45 EST).
8 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES,
EMPLoYMENT, & RATES OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY SELECTED WORKER
CHARACTERISTICS, OCCUPATIONS, & INDUSTRIES (2006), available at
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/CFOIRates_2006.pdf (driver/sales workers and truck drivers).
9 Id. (Coal mining fatality rate 49.5; Fishing and related fishing worker fatality rate 147.2).
10 Id. (Structural iron and steel workers fatality rate 61; coal mining fatality rate 49.5; refuse
and recyclable material collectors fatality rate 40).
11 Id. (Retail store workers have a fatality rate of 1.8.).
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ground; whereas underground coal miners will never have that luxury, no matter
how many laws are enacted by Congress.
In this respect, the differences in safety between occupations is not rele-
vant from a public policy perspective. While the egalitarian view does have its
advocates, 12 it defies common sense to believe, much less strive toward, making
all workplaces equal in terms of risk. Driving trucks across frozen lakes and
harvesting crabs from the Bering Sea will always be more inherently dangerous
than the office work performed by lawyers and professors.' 3 Thus, emphasizing
that coal mining is more dangerous than other occupations is an essentially
meaningless observation that is not indicative of a "problem."
There might be a "problem" if coal mining was getting less safe over
time. In this regard, the public perception in 2006, after the twelve miners were
killed at the Sago mine, was that coal mines were becoming more dangerous.
However, the perception was largely influenced by the fact that the Sago disas-
ter occurred on January 2, 2006. From a statistics perspective, the Sago mine
disaster would have been expected to occur in 2005, which happened to be the
safest year ever in the United States in terms of coal mining fatalities. 14 Had the
Sago disaster occurred just three days earlier in calender year 2005, the trend, in
terms of absolute coal mining fatalities, would be largely intact. 5 And when
compared to recent increases in U.S. coal production to meet the growing
worldwide demand for fossil fuels, the trend is certainly still toward safer coal
mines on a fatality per million ton basis.'
6
In addition to its occurrence in the wrong calendar year, the Sago mine
disaster was perceived as evidence of a "problem" due to two other factors.
First, a large number of miners died at one time. In this respect, mine disasters
are similar to train wrecks and airplane crashes in that they are stark reminders
of the fragility and vulnerability of human life. However, the loss of multiple
lives, by itself, is not always enough to motivate lawmakers to make laws. For
12 See, e.g., AFL-CIO, THE STATE OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH 1-2 (2008), available at
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/uploadL02.pdf ("Unfortunately, as demonstrated by
the Sago mine disaster and other recent coal disasters, too many workers remain at risk, and face
death, injury or disease as a result of their jobs. ... The nation is falling further and further behind
in achieving the promise of safe jobs for America's workers.").
13 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 8. (Professional and related occupations 0.9).
14 There were twenty-three coal mine fatalities in calendar year 2005. MINE SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COAL FATALITIES BY STATE (2008),
http:/www.msha.gov/stats/charts/coalbystate.asp.
15 Id. Annual coal mining fatalities if the Sago mine disaster had occurred on December 31,
2005: 2000 (38), 2001 (42), 2002 (27), 2003 (30), 2004 (28), 2005 (35), 2006 (35), 2007 (34).
(author moved 12 fatalities from 2006 to 2005).
16 U.S. Coal Production in million short tons: 2003 (1071), 2004 (1112), 2005 (1131), 2006
(1162), 2007 (1145). FRED FREME, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. COAL SUPPLY & DEMAND: 2007
REVIEW (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coallpage/special/feature.htm; see also
Ruffennach, supra note 5 at 17, Fig. 7.
[Vol. I111
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example, Congress did not amend the Mine Act following the Jim Walters mine
disaster in 2001, even though thirteen miners were killed.
17
The second, and more important, component of the Sago mine disaster
is that it played out in national news over a long period of time. The Sago trag-
edy, like the Quecreek mine rescue in 1998, was the leading news story for over
one week. However, unlike Quecreek, the rescue attempt at the Sago mine was
largely unsuccessful, leaving the public with twelve tragedies and only one
miracle. 18 Worse, the media accounts of the disaster gave the public false hope
in the final hours.' 9 Neither American society nor its lawmakers were accus-
tomed to seeing industrial accidents of this magnitude end so terribly.
Thus, on the most fundamental level, the "problem" being examined by
the symposium is in large part a perfect storm of an anomalous statistical event,
a traumatic mass death and a dramatic media portrayal. The storm analogy is
especially appropriate in light of the fact that the trigger of the Sago mine disas-
ter was lightning resulting from a statistically rare winter thunderstorm.2°
II. SAFETY AND RISK
The lightning storm on January 2, 2006, ignited methane gas that had
accumulated in abandoned areas of the Sago mine. Methane is a known risk of
coal mining. Exposed coal liberates methane. Methane is highly explosive
when the methane to air ratio is between five to fifteen percent.2' Methane igni-
tions can generate tremendous explosive forces, particularly when there is coal
dust available to fuel the explosion.
17 See generally MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH, No. 01-
01322, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: FATAL UNDERGROUND COAL MINE EXPLOSIONS, JIM WALTER
RESOURCES, INC. (2002), available at http://www.msha.gov/fatals/200 l/jwr5/ftlOl c2O32light.pdf.
18 Seventeen miners escaped the explosion. Craig Newsome, et al, Letter from Sago Miners,
DOMINION POST, Feb. 3, 2006, at Al. ("You see there was not one survivor of the explosion but
seventeen (17). The "One Left" crew was in direct line of the explosion within 1,000 feet but
none of them were seriously injured by the blast. Why????? Well, we will tell you why. It was
because the area of the mine was so well rock dusted and maintained that the explosion did not
propagate at all. When it ran out of methane it stopped.")
19 David Conti, Families, Friends Rejoice at Church, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REv., Jan. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_410173.htnl (Families were incor-
rectly told that the trapped miners were alive, when in fact only one of the miners survived).
20 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION, FATAL
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE EXPLOSION: JANUARY 2, 2006, SAGO MINE 54, available at
http:l/www.msha.gov/Fatals/2006/Sago/Overview/SAGO%201nvestigationOverview.pps (con-
cluding that a "lightning strike over the sealed area indirectly energizing metallic objects within
the sealed area" was the "most likely ignition source of the explosion.").
21 NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
FOCUS ON COAL MINING: SAFETY HAZARDS, HEALTH HAZARDS, MINE RESCUE, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/inerescue/.
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In active working areas of coal mines, the risk presented by the methane
is mitigated in a number of ways.22 The risk is primarily mitigated by ventila-
tion, which dilutes the methane and removes it from the mine. As mines get
larger, they become somewhat more difficult to ventilate. Periodically, inactive
mine areas are sealed off from the active mine with block walls. Methane is
then permitted to accumulate in these areas. Usually, the methane in these ar-
eas accumulates in such great quantities that it is no longer explosive. The
methane explosion at the Sago mine involved a methane ignition in an aban-
doned area that had been deliberately sealed off from the active mine.23
Methane explosions are just one of the many risks faced by coal miners.
The short list of risks also includes roof and rock falls, inundation, fire, poison-
ous gases, high voltage electricity and hazards posed by large moving equip-
ment. The risks are inherent and cannot be totally eliminated so long as humans
are working underground.
Safety is only achieved by actively managing and controlling the risks.
In a mine, the process of controlling and managing risk requires constant vigi-
lance, not only 24/7 but also 60/60. Conditions in mines do not change quar-
terly,24 but change by the second. Mine operators and miners have to constantly
adjust to the changing conditions. They make hundreds of decisions each day
that impact safety.
In addition to taking place in real time, the process of managing risk
takes place in the real world, where it is understood that safety is relative, not
absolute. For example, in a fantasy world where resources were not finite, it
would be possible to put new tires on mine haulage equipment everyday. New
tires, which offer better traction and less opportunity for failure, provide maxi-
mum safety. However, mine operators do not put new tires on their mining ve-
hicles at the start of each work shift, just like ordinary citizens do not put new
tires on their cars before driving to work in the morning. Whether or not the
wear on an existing tire warrants replacement depends not only on the extent
and nature of the wear, but also the size and loads carried, the haul road surface,
condition and profile, the length of the haul cycle, the vehicle speed, and the
22 Id.
23 See MiNE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH, Report of Investiga-
tion: Fatal Underground Coal Mine Explosions, Sago Mine, at 195, available at
http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/2006/Sago/ftl06C 1-12.pdf.
24 Under the Mine Act, there are four inspections of underground coal mines per year. 30
U.S.C. § 813 (2006).
25 Carl Metzgar, Three-hundred Ninety-nine to One, Prr & QuARRY, March 1, 2006,
available at http://www.pitandquarry.comL/pitandquary/Safety/Three-hundred-ninety-nine-to-
one/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/311551 ("It gets more daunting when the number of tasks at a
mine is multiplied by the number of repetitions. The opportunity for the accumulation of little
oversights to add up to a big failure is huge. But if the automobile experience is close to being
correct, the industry's general success comes from a tremendous amount of individual effort by a
lot of miners for each injury that is prevented.").
[Vol. I111
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number and cycles per work shift.2 6 Given all of the variables, reasonable per-
sons can fairly disagree about the precise point at which wear on a tire becomes
"unsafe. 27 In this respect, safety is undeniably subjective.
The process of managing risk also involves complicated trade-offs. For
example, new tires on a piece of mobile equipment might inadvertently em-
bolden the equipment operator to operate the equipment at higher speeds
thereby increasing the risk of a traffic accident.28 Even if the new tires reduce
the risk of traffic accidents overall, putting new tires on a piece of mobile
equipment creates a new set of hazards for the maintenance crew that has to
change the tires.29 Reasonable persons can also disagree as to whether it is ap-
propriate to substitute one risk for another risk.3 °
Not everyone is comfortable working in an environment in which risks
have to be constantly managed. Miners are generally persons who have a higher
than normal tolerance for risk, like the crab fisherman and ice road truckers
whose jobs are acclaimed on television.3' In this respect, miners are different
than most lawyers, law professors, legislators, regulators, and judges who gen-
erally prefer work environments that present fewer physical hazards.
26 See Mark Robins, Choosing the Correct Off-Road Tires, ROCK PRODUCTS, Oct 1, 1998,
available at http://rockproducts.com/mag/rock choosing-correctoffroad.
27 See, e.g., Amax Coal West, Inc., 19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1311, 1316 (1997) ("[Tlhe company's
witnesses are reasonably prudent men with more familiarity with the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the hole in the tire than the inspector, particularly as the tire was being used at this mine,
and that they properly did not recognize any hazard warranting corrective action."); Big Sky Coal
Co., 20 F.M.S.H.R.C 582, 587-89 (1998) ("[T]he Secretary did not prove a reasonably prudent
person, familiar with the tire in question and the circumstances under which it was used at the Big
Sky Mine, would have expected the tire to blowout.... What appears 'terrible,' may or may not
be safe."); Triton Coal Co., 19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1630, 1631 (1997) ('The parties disagree whether a
tire on a 190 ton haulage truck affected safety."); see also Arch of West Virginia, 28
F.M.S.H.R.C. 694, 697 (2006) ("Because there is a component of tire safety that is relative to their
conditions of use, such factual matters may be relevant when determining whether the tires were
unsafe.").
28 Carl R. Metzgar, The Best Loss Control has a Downside, Prr & QUARRY, July 8, 2008,
available at http://www.pitandquarry.comlpitandquarrylSafety/The-best-loss-control-has-a-
downside/ArticleStandard/Articledetail/528675 ('There is a name for this phenomenon of taking
more risk when hazards are reduced or a protective measure is introduced. Some authors call this
risk compensation; others call it risk homeostasis.").
29 See generally MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, TIRE AND RIM SAFETY
AWARENESS PROGRAM, available at http:lwww.msha.govlS&HINFOIIG60.PDF; see also, Pea-
body Coal Company, 1 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1494 (1979) (fatal accident during tire changing).
30 See Rawl Sales & Processing Co., 23 F.M.S.H.R.C. 463, 466 (2001) ("Since I cannot dis-
cern what mining danger threatens miners at home in their beds, I will not support the Secretary's
gratuitous demand that Rawl order miners underground for several hours, who would otherwise be
at home, to conduct an 'on-shift' examination to protect nobody from anything.") (Commissioner
Riley).
31 See, e.g., Ice Road Truckers, http://www.history.com/minisites/iceroadtruckers (last visited
Sept. 9, 2008); see also Deadliest Catch,
http://dsc.discovery.comfansites/deadliestcatch/deadliestcatch.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
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While the so-called risk preferences of individuals vary, to a large ex-
tent the variation is constrained by society's overall risk preferences. In general,
a wealthy society, like the United States, will have a lower tolerance for work-
place risk than a poorer one. For example, although China produces about twice
as much coal as the United States,32 the number of coal mining fatalities in
China exceeds the United States by more than a factor of 100.33 The incredible
disparity in risk tolerances primarily reflects the very different standards of liv-
ing in the two nations.
4
III. SAFETY AND FREE MARKETS
In the absence of government direction, the information about an indi-
vidual's, and indirectly society's, risk preferences is conveyed through the free
market. A free market exists anywhere there is a voluntary exchange of goods
or services. 35 Free market theory does not make judgments about the partici-
pant's morality. The only assumption is that, in general, market participants
will make decisions that are in their own self-interest. If the exchange is not a
win-win, it will not take place. In coal mining, for example, miners exchange
their labor for a wage paid by the mine operator.
The exchange between the miner and the mine operator reflects and af-
fects the safety of the mine. Because coal mining is recognized as being more
dangerous than working at Wal-Mart, coal miners demand additional compensa-
tion for the heightened risk of death.3 6  If mine operators did not offer higher
wages, a rational, self-interested worker would opt for the safer job working at
Wal-Mart. 37 To minimize the risk premium paid to miners, a rational, self-
interested mine operator will make investments to improve work place safety.
38
32 David Barboza, 105 Dead After Explosion in China Mining Region, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2007, at A6.
33 Id. ("China reported about 4,700 miners were killed in accidents" in 2006).
34 Ruffenach, supra note 5, at 30-31. See generally, Tim Wright, The Political Economy of
Coal Mine Disasters in China: "Your Rice Bowl or Your Life," 179 CHINA Q. 629 (2004); see also
Ben Blanchard, Poverty Pushes Chinese into Risky Mining Jobs, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/O9/11/business/mine.php.
35 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1990).
36 See, e.g., Robin Acton, Ex-miner Recalls Sago: "It was a Hellhole," PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE
REV., Jan 6, 2006, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s410907.htm
("Even if it's cold, damp and dangerous, it's good money in your pocket and food on your table.
And that's important to men who didn't make it to college but have families to feed and bills to
pay").
37 For example, the International Coal Group has identified "any negative perceptions about
our safety record affecting our ability to attract skilled labor" as business risk following the Sago
mine accident. INT'L COAL GROUP, BUILDING A STRONG FUTURE: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 37
(2007), available at http:l/www.intlcoal.comlpages/investors/ICO2007AR.pdf.
38 See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE (1983); see also PRICE V. FISHEACK, SOFT COAL, HARD CHOICES 79-98 (1992). But
see Hal Sider, Safety and Productivity in Underground Coal Mining, 65 REV. OF ECON. & STAT.
[Vol. I111
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The risk premiums paid to miners are in addition to workers' compensa-
tion premiums paid by mine operators. In most states, a coal mine operator with
a high accident rate pays more in workers' compensation premiums. 39 Thus,
workers' compensation premiums create another quasi-market incentive to
maintain a safe mine. 40
There are significant costs associated with mining accidents.4' The
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has a tool on its web site that
estimates the direct costs associated with mining accidents.42 The costs are sub-
stantial: non-reportable accidents cost about $7,000; disabling injuries cost
about $28,000; and fatal injuries cost almost $1 million.43 MSHA's calculator
also shows that a mine operator with $4 billion in sales and a 10% profit margin
would need to produce another $9.1 million in additional product to pay for the
costs of one fatality. 44 To avoid these costs, an operator has substantial incen-
tives to maintain a safe mine.
The marketplace for mine safety is complex and not limited to the ex-
changes between miners and mine operators and workers' compensation funds.
Exchanges between mine operators and their shareholders, their insurers and
their vendors, and service providers also impact the safety of the mine. For ex-
ample, fire, explosion, inundation, and roof failure hazards that endanger miners
also have the potential to destroy equipment, infrastructure and even reserves.
Shareholders demand that mine operators take safety measures that will protect
their invested capital and provide a reasonable return on investment. Insurance
companies, which play a role in protecting invested capital, demand that mine
225, 225, 231 (1983) (suggesting, but not concluding, that at union coal mining operations where
wages are not determined competitively, a mine operator's wage costs might be insensitive to
risk).
39 West Virginia's workers' compensation program is only partially based on the injury ex-
perience of the operator. See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-4(A)(d)(2) (2008). ("The rule shall require the
establishment of a program under which the commissioner may grant discounts on premium rates
for employers who meet either of the following requirements: (A) Have not incurred a com-
pensable injury for one year or more and who maintain an employee safety committee or similar
organization and make periodic safety inspections of the workplace.").
40 See generally Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety Through Workers'
Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance, 20 RAND JOURNAL OF
EcON. 499 (1989); see also PRICE V. FiSHBACK & SHAWN E. KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE
WELFARE STATE 77-83 (2000).
41 For example, the International Coal Group took a $13 million charge in 2006 "relating to
the Sago mine accident, including reserves established for claims and other future costs and $4.7
million of carrying costs related to the mining operation prior to resuming operations at the end of
the first quarter." INT'L COAL GROUP, MINING OPPORTUNITIES: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 87 (2006),
available at http://www.intlcoal.com/pages/investors/ICO2006AR.pdf.





Ruffennach: Free Markets, Individual Liberties and Safe Coal Mines: A Post-Sa
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
operators take safety measures to minimize the potential for a Ioss. 45 The bot-
tom line is that the safety of a mine is impacted by a large number of complex
exchanges. 46
IV. GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION
Prior to 1969 and the enactment of the Coal Act, the governmental solu-
tion to the "problem" of coal mine safety was a market-friendly one. The fed-
eral government did not focus on punishing coal operators for violations of
regulations but instead focused its attention on creating safety information and
providing it to the market participants.
The primary mission of the Bureau of Mines, which was established
within the Department of the Interior in 1910, was to develop and provide in-
formation to miners and mine operators regarding coal mine safety.47 Although
the Bureau of Mines did obtain authority to order the closure of mines in 1952
for the violation of safety regulations, the Bureau never had authority to issue
civil or criminal penalties for first instance violations. In this important respect,
the Bureau of Mines was not a law enforcement agency as MSHA is today.
The federal government's information approach complemented the
market.48 Information helps market participants make better exchanges. Miners
have to understand risks in order to demand appropriate risk premiums. Infor-
mation also helps mine operators make sound investments in safety. For exam-
ple, the possibility of lightning igniting methane underground was not a widely
known or understood risk prior to the Sago mine disaster.49 The essence of safe-
ty is the recognition and avoidance of hazards, neither of which can happen
without information.
45 For example, in its 2007 annual report, the International Coal Group has identified "any
increased premiums for insurance and any claims that may be asserted against us that are not
covered, in whole or in part, by our insurance policies" as presenting a risk to its business arising
from the Sago mine accident. INT'L COAL GROUP, BUILDING A STRONG FUTURE, supra note 37, at
37.
46 There has not been a great deal of study of the market for mine safety to measure incentives
and premiums. The principles discussed in the article are predictions based on observations made
by researchers in other industries.
47 See Mark Aldrich, Preventing "The Needless Peril of the Coal Mine": The Bureau of
Mines and the Campaign Against Mine Explosions, 1910-1940, 36 TECH. & CULTURE 483,491-95
(1995); RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON UNDERGROUND COAL MINE SAFETY & COMMITTEE ON
ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH SYSTEMS, TOWARD SAFER UNDERGROUND MINES 53 (1982). See
generally FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 40, at 113.
48 See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 40, at 113 (2000); Aldrich, supra note 47, at 501.
49 See MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA'S
ACTIONS AT THE SAGO MINE WOLF RUN MINING COMPANY SAGO, UPSHUR COUNTY, WEST
VIRGINIA l, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.msha.gov/Readroom/FOIA/20071ntemalReviews/Sago%201nternal%20Review%2OR
eport.pdf [hereinafter INTERNAL REVIEW].
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One notable example of the government's early success with informa-
tion was the Bureau's information campaign to convince mine operators to use
rock dust to minimize explosions in underground coal mines. The rock dust
prevents the coal dust from becoming an explosion hazard by diluting and cov-
ering the coal dust.50 Mine insurers recognized the value of the information
created by the Bureau's rock dust research and offered mine operators a reduced
premium for applying rock dust.51 As a result, mine operators began using rock
dust, even though there was no legal mandate to do so.
V. PERCEPTION AND REALITY
The market-based approach to mine safety, with the federal government
playing an information-provider role, led to safer mines. For example, almost
immediately after the Bureau provided the rock dusting information to the mar-
ketplace, the frequency and severity of coal mine explosions declined. Overall,
fewer miners were being killed each year.52 In terms of fatalities per million
tons of coal mined, mine safety was improving at a rapid pace.53 In 1910, about
29 miners were killed for every 5 million tons of coal produced, whereas by
1969, about 2 miners were killed for every 5 million tons of coal produced.
54
Although coal mines were steadily getting safer, the Farmington mine
disaster in 1968 triggered federal scrutiny of the safety of the nation's coal
mines. Like the Sago mine disaster, the Farmington mine disaster, in which
seventy-eight miners died, played out on television sets across America. 55 Con-
gress believed that the market for mine safety had failed and needed to be
fixed.56
Despite the Farmington disaster, there was scant evidence in 1969 that
the free market was not properly conveying information about society's growing
aversion to mining and other risks, which was associated with the rising stan-
dard of living in the United States. It is true that there was a history of mine
disasters leading up to 1969. However, up until Farmington, the severity and
50 See 30 C.F.R. § 75.2 (2008) (defining rock dust).
51 See G.B. Butterfield, Employers Now Given Insurance Credit for Rock Dusting to Prevent
Coal Mine Explosions, 14 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 276, 277 (1924).
52 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NUMBER OF FATALITIES AND FATALITY RATES (FIVE-
YEAR AGGREGATES) IN THE MINING INDUSTRY BY COMMODITY, 1911-2005, available at
http://cdc.gov/niosh/niining/statistics/pdfs/Lhist _2.pdf.
53 See Ruffennach, supra note 5, at 16, fig. 6.
54 Id. at 7 (author's calculation 1910:2821/416,166,000 & 1969:203/570,670,000 (fractions
reduced by a factor of 100 and rounded)).
55 Chris Stirewalt, Loss of Life Leads to Change, CHARLESTON DAILY MAlL, Feb. 9, 1999, at
1A.
56 30 U.S.C. § 801(c) (2006) ("... to provide more effective means and measures for improv-
ing the working conditions and practices in the Nation's coal ... mines.").
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frequency of those disasters was declining. 57 Again, overall coal mining fatali-
ties were declining at a rapid pace.
The only indication that safety was not improving was the rate of fatali-
ties per 100,000 coal miners, which had not substantially declined in the two
decades before 1969.58 However, the fatalities per 100,000 coal miners rate was
not a reliable indicator of the progress in coal mine safety because it did not take
into account changes in coal production.59  In the decades preceding 1969, the
mechanization of mining enabled each miner to mine coal at a faster pace.
60
The increased amount and pace of mining exposed a decreasing number of min-
ers to more hazards. 6' Thus, the rate of fatalities per 100,000 miners did not
improve, even though there were substantially fewer fatalities overall and fewer
fatalities per ton of coal mined.62
VI. PREFERENCES AND PAY
Despite the lack of credible evidence that mines were not getting safer,
Congress perceived the mining industry as being "inexcusably wasteful of our
most precious asset - the human being., 63 In essence, Congress did not believe
that the nation's miners were receiving adequate compensating premiums for
the risks that they were facing in the mines. Put another way, Congress did not
trust the miners of West Virginia and other coal states to make free choices that
were in their own best self-interest.
64
57 See Centers for Disease Control, Coal Mining Disasters (Incidents with Five or More Fa-
talities), available at http://cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/discoal.htm.
58 The former Department of the Interior Secretary Walter J. Hickel testified that "there has
been no improvement in the overall fatality rate since 1947." H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 2506
(1969). See NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, NUMBER OF FATALITIES & FATALITY RATES IN THE MINING INDUSTRY BY COMMODITY,
1931-2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/pdfs/f hist-l.pdf.
59 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY
176-77 (1985).
60 "As an old American folk song notes, an underground coal miner once shoveled 'sixteen
tons' a day. In 1993, underground 'longwall' coal miners in the Western United States produced
an average of 5.7 tons of coal per worker-hour." J. David McAteer, Don't Undermine Mine Safe-
ty, 16 MULTINATIONAL MONrrOR 3 (1995), available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1995/10/mml095_05.html.
61 H.R. REP. No. 95-312, reprint (1977), available at http://www.msha.gov/SOLICITOR/
COALACT/leghistl.htm ("Studies have shown that accelerated emphasis on production tends to
push up both fatality and injury rates among the miners.").
62 See generally Maury Gittleman & Brooks Pierce, A Different Approach to Measuring
Workplace Safety: Injuries and Fatalities Relative to Output, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 4
(July 26, 2006), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/sh20060724ar0l p l.htm.
63 Walter J. Hickel, Department of the Interior Secretary, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at
2507 (1969).
64 The Congress apparently bought into an old aphorism often attributed to Mark Twain:
"Mine: a hole in the ground with a fool at the bottom and a liar at the top."
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The problem with second-guessing the risk premiums that are de-
manded by workers is that neither Congress nor regulators do a very good job of
balancing risk and pay on behalf of others. Lawyers, professors, and govern-
ment officials are not in the best position to make these very personal choices.
65
For example, an individual that invests the risk premium that he earns by work-
ing in a mine on regular health care, new tires on his car, and safe housing might
have less overall mortality risk than the individual who opted out of the mines
and took a statistically safer, but lesser paying job at Wal-Mart. 66 These choices
need to be made by individuals that wear the boots, not the individuals that wear
the suits.
67
VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Although Congress essentially perceived the risk for pay balance as be-
ing askew, Congress was only in a position to alter one side of the equation.
Obviously, federal legislation to increase the hazard pay for one group of work-
ers would not bode well with other workers. Therefore, Congress sought to alter
the safety side of the equation.68 And the Nixon Administration, which had no
faith in free markets, 69 endorsed Congress's plans to supplant the market for
coal mine safety with federal command and control style regulation.
Even though the problem identified by Congress was an economic one
of perceived asset misallocation, Congress came up with a legal solution to alter
65 See Viscusi, supra note 38, at 80 ("Since risky jobs become unattractive the higher one's
income class, we should expect that many of those who are most outspoken on policy issues will
consider the jobs of workers in hazardous industries abhorrent."); JOHN MENDELOFF, REGULATING
SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY
160 (1979) ("Without being easily able to rely on their own personal appraisal of the risk, they are
placed in a more paternalistic position.").
66 MENDELOFF, supra note 65, at 32-33 ("Other losers are workers who prefer facing job haz-
ards... [and] [w]orkers who have to surrender risk premiums .... ").
67 Newsome, supra note 18, at Al ("We work at this mine because we choose to, not because
we have to. We are proud of our mine and the miners we work with here. These men are well
trained and operate million dollar pieces of equipment with in the confines of the coal mine as
easily as you do your riding mower on your lawn. We are intelligent, skilled and are aware of our
surroundings. None of us would ever allow any condition to exist that would injure one of our
fellow workers on purpose. Every time that any of us have become aware of any hazard and
reported it to any member of the company they have corrected it almost immediately. We feel
that we have a safe mine or we would not work here.").
68 S.R. REP. No. 95-181, at 3408 (1977) ("The Committee believes that there is great need to
encourage young people to go into the occupation of mining as the need of our nation for the
minerals and energy sources extracted from the earth continues to increase. It is the Committee's
feeling that the duty of the Congress, if it is to encourage such employment, is to make that em-
ployment as safe as possible.").
69 Although the Nixon Administration was considered to be philosophically conservative, its
actions demonstrated a distrust in the power of markets and in the freedom of individuals. The,
Nixon Administration went so far as to impose wage and price controls in 1971. See generally
DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAw, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS 60-64 (1998).
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the risk-pay equation.70 The legal solution was the 1969 Coal Act. While it is
ironic that Congress implemented a legalistic approach to the perceived eco-
nomic problem, it is not surprising given the prevalence of lawyers in Con-
71gress.
Thus, instead of imposing an injury tax on the mining industry or creat-
ing other incentives for investment in safety, Congress contrived a quasi-
contractual system that allocated rights and duties within the mining industry.72
Essentially, the Coal Act gave miners the right to a safe workplace and imposed
on mine operators the duty of providing a safe workplace. The federal govern-
ment took on the thankless role of enforcing those rights and duties.73
In its deliberate attempt to supplant the market, it is important to note
that Congress also inadvertently relegated the states as minor players in coal
mine safety.74 The states have authority under their criminal codes to punish
workplace conduct that is outside the range of societal norms. 75 Typically, such
law enforcement focuses on bad actors that cause actual harm to others.76 How-
ever, the extensive federal presence in the nation's mines marginalized the role
of state law enforcement in removing bad actors from mining.77
VIII. SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE
To a large extent, the legalistic approach also shifted society's focus
from safety to compliance. For example, following the Sago mine disaster, the
media flocked to MSHA's web site to examine the compliance record of the
70 H.R. REP. No. 91-563 (10969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2507 ("A strong law
is necessary to protect the men who extract one of our Nation's most vital resources.").
71 See MILDRED AMER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 109 T CONGRESS: A
PROFILE 1, 3 n.6 (2006), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf
("In the overwhelming majority of previous Congresses, business has followed law as the domi-
nant occupation of Members. In the 109th Congress, 218 Members (160 Representatives, 58
Senators) list their occupation as law .... ); see also MENDELOFF, supra note 65, at 26 ("[Tlhe
legal background of most congressmen ... inclines them to make the reallocation of legal rights
and duties rather than economic incentives the tool for effecting changes in behavior.").
72 Compare 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) ("the first priority and concern of all in the coal or other min-
ing industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource-the miner") and § 801(e)
("the operators of such mines ... have the primary responsibility to prevent [accidents]"). See
also 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a), 821 (2008).
73 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 811 (regulation), 813 (inspection) and 814, 817 & 820 (sanctions)
(2008).
74 See 30 U.S.C. § 955 (no preemption of state regulation).
75 See generally David Rosner, When Does a Worker's Death Become Murder?, 90 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH, 535, 535-36 (2000).
76 See generally Jordan Barab, Guilty! Successful Homicide Prosecution Against Company
that Killed Two Workers in Arizona, 16 NEw SOLUTIONS: A J. OF ENvTL. & OCCUPATIONAL POL'Y
17,17 (2006).
77 See Ruffennach, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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Wolf Creek Mining Company.78 Evidently, the assumption was that the opera-
tor's compliance history would provide clues about the cause of the accident.
Many lay persons, and even some prominent politicians, fell into the trap of
equating compliance with safety.79
The fallacy of this line of investigation is that an operator's violation
history does not correlate with an operator's safety record.80 The dichotomy
between compliance and safety exists because compliance is only a measure of
law enforcement activity at a mine. It does not measure safety at a mine, in
terms of injuries or fatalities. Unlike fatalities and injuries, which are real, vio-
lations are just pieces of paper that contain subjective opinions about whether
perceived conditions may or may not present a hazard.
Perhaps the best example of the subjectivity is 30 C.F.R. 75.400, which
happens to be the most frequently cited underground coal standard, accounting
for over 16% of all underground coal mine safety violations issued by MSHA.81
The regulation simply and plainly prohibits the "accumulation of combustible
materials" in underground coal mines.82 The difficulty with the regulation is
that the determinations as to whether there is an "accumulation" and whether the
accumulation is "combustible" are highly subjective.
78 See Brian Bowling & C.M. Mortimer, Safety Citations Up Eighty-Four Percent,
PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REv., Jan. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.pittsburghlive.comlx/pittsburghtrib/s_410135.html; Alan Levin, et al, Mine Had Hun-
dreds of Violations, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2006, at A3; Joby Warrick, Safety Violations Have Piled
Up at Coal Mine, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A4.
79 See Senalor Robert C. Byrd, Address Before the Senate, Enough: No More Failures for
Coal Miners (Jan. 25, 2006), http://byrd.senate.gov/speeches/2006january/mine-safety.html
("Let us begin with the coal company that operated the Sago Mine, which had been issued 276
safety and health violations in 2004 and 2005. Let me put that into perspective. Could any driver
rack up 276 tickets for reckless driving and still keep a license? What if someone had 276 mis-
takes on a tax return? You can bet that taxpayer would be looking at serious penalties and possibly
jail time in a federal prison. But here was a coal company with 276 federal mine safety violations
still operating. While some of these were minor transgressions, too many of them were 'Signifi-
cant and Substantial,' or, simply put, very serious, and, yet, business went on as usual.").
80 ICF CONSULTING, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY
PROGRAM EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 3-8 (2003), available at
http://www.msha.gov/readroomFOIA/SpecialReports/ICFlnspectionReport/MSHAMinelnspectio
nProgramEvaluationReport.pdf ("At the district level we also found a similar pattern in the data-
for the most part there is no clear relationship between the total number of fatalities and days lost
injuries and the total number of citations and S&S citations issued during regular inspections. We
were told that earlier MSHA studies had indicated similar results.").
81 Mine Safety and Health Admin., Most Frequently Cited Standards for 2007 - Underground
- Coal (2007), available at http://www.msha.gov/statsltop20viols/top2Oviols.asp [hereinafter
Most Frequently Cited Standards for 2007].
82 30 C.F.R. § 75.400 (2008) ("Accumulation of combustible materials. Coal dust, including
float coal dust deposited on rock-dusted surfaces, loose coal, and other combustible materials,
shall be cleaned up and not be permitted to accumulate in active workings, or on diesel-powered
and electric equipment therein.").
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The question of "accumulations" is problematic because the line be-
tween spillage and accumulations is not a bright one. As coal is being mined
and transported, it spills. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion has noted "spillage of combustible materials may be inevitable in mining
operations." 83 The point at which ordinary spillage becomes an "accumulation"
is determined on a case by case basis. The Commission has taken the approach
that spillage constitutes an "accumulation" if "the quantity of combustible mate-
rials is such that, in the judgment of the authorized representative of the Secre-
tary, it likely could cause or propagate a fire or explosion if an ignition source
were present."84 In other words, if the inspector cites the spillage, it is trans-
formed into an "accumulation." In a later case, the Commission backed off its
earlier holding somewhat by substituting the judgment of a "reasonably prudent
person" for the judgment of the inspector.85 But the Commission has never
identified the threshold "quantity" of spillage that constitutes an "accumula-
tion."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the only federal court to
address the question of "accumulations," has taken a slightly different ap-
proach.86 The court explained "while everyone knows that loose coal is gener-
ated by mining in a coal mine, the regulation plainly prohibits permitting it to
accumulate; hence it must be cleaned up with reasonable promptness, with all
convenient speed. 87 Thus, instead of focusing on the quantity of the spillage
like the Commission, the Tenth Circuit would focus on the duration that the
spillage has existed.88 However, beyond the generic guidelines of "reasonable-
ness promptness" and "convenient speed," which are terms not used in the regu-
lation, the court did not specify a threshold time in which spillage transforms
into "accumulation."
The "combustibility" question is even more subjective than the "accu-
mulation" question. Coal dust and float coal dust is perpetually generated by
active mining operations. Because the dust cannot be vacuumed off the mine
roof and walls, it is largely controlled by covering it with rock dust, which, as
indicated above, is an incombustible material. 89 Thus, whether or not an opera-
83 Old Ben Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2806, 2808 (1980).
84 Id.
85 See Utah Power & Light Co., Mining Division, 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 965, 969 (1990), affd
Utah Power & Light Co., Min. Div. v. Sec'y of Labor, 951 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1991).
86 Utah Power & Light Co., 951 F.2d at 295 n.1 1.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 296.
89 See 30 C.F.R. 75.402 (2008); see also Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, Float Coal Dust Explosion Hazards, 515 TECH. NEWS 1,
1-2, available at http://www.msha.gov/s&hinfo/rockdusting/nioshfloatcoal.pdf ("Generalized
rock dusting is currently the primary means of defense against coal dust explosions in U.S.
mines."); but see Mullins & Sons Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 192, 197 (1994) (rockdusting is not
a substitute for cleaning other accumulations of coal).
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tor is in violation of 30 C.F.R 75.400 depends in large part on the ratio of com-
bustible to incombustible materials in the dust.90 Because sampling and testing
of incombustible content is not required,9' the combustibility determination is
based largely on the color of the area. Pure white areas, which suggest high
incombustible rock dust content, are not in violation; but pure black areas,
which suggest high amounts of combustible coal, are in violation. The problem
is that most areas in a coal mine are various shades of gray. Thus, in many cas-
es, whether or not there is a "violation" of 30 C.F.R. 75.400 depends, quite liter-
ally, on which "shade of gray" is observed by the inspector.92 The subjectivity
involved in differentiating "shades of gray" in a dark coal mine is obvious.9 3
IX. FORCED-COMPLIANCE AND FREE MARKETS
Even though there is a questionable relationship between safety and
compliance, government regulation of workplace safety is taken for granted
nowadays. When a mine disaster like Sago occurs, society's immediate reaction
is that the mining industry requires more regulation and tougher enforcement. 94
In this respect, it is not surprising that shortly after the Sago mine disaster, Con-
gress hastily enacted the MINER Act to require new regulations and to streng-
then the existing enforcement provisions of the Mine Act. The Sago mine disas-
ter also motivated MSHA to increase civil penalties across all mining industries,
even though the agency was not mandated to do so by Congress.95 The irony of
the public, Congressional, and agency reaction to the Sago mine disaster is that,
in many respects, the Sago mine disaster highlights the fundamental flaws in the
forced-compliance approach. Despite its mainstream acceptance and popular
appeal, more than anything else, the forced-compliance approach to mine safety
interferes with the market approach to mine safety by substituting rules for re-
90 There are specific ratios of incombustible content that must be met. 30 C.F.R. 75.403
(2008).
91 See MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., MSHA HANDBOOK SERIES: GENERAL COAL MINE
INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND INSPECTION TRACKING SYSTEM 1, 64 (2008) ("Visual determinations
are normally sufficient to determine non-compliance with 75.400.").
92 Compare Consolidation Coal Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1286, 1299-1301 (1994) (A.L.J.) (gray
color not indicative of violation), and Consolidation Coal Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 487, 493-495
(1981) (A.L.J.) (gray color not indicative of violation), with Consolidation Coal Co., 15
F.M.S.H.R.C. 2255, 2259-2266 (1993) (A.L.J.) (gray color indicative of violation), and Consoli-
dation Coal Co., WEVA 88-139 1 (1988) (gray color indicative of violation), and C.C.C.-Pompey
Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 163, 169 (1980) (A.L.J.) (gray color indicative of violation).
93 See 5 MSHA PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL, supra note 89, at 49("There may be times when
the inspector's interpretation of what is an accumulation of float coal dust, loose coal and coal dust
and/or other combustible materials will differ with the opinion of others.").
94 Scott Lilly, MSHA and the Sago Mine Disaster (Jan. 6, 2006),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/01/b1333967.html; Ian Urbina & Andrew W. Le-
hren, U.S. Is Reducing Safety Penalties for Mine Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al.
95 See Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-236,
120 Stat. 493 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
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suits, by substituting federal inspections for private audits and by substituting
sanctions for cooperation.
A. Rules Versus Results
Following the Sago mine disaster, MSHA undertook an extensive inves-
tigation of the accident.96 The primary focus of the investigation was to deter-
mine whether violations of federal regulations caused or contributed to the acci-
dent.97 The conclusion was that the accident did not result from non-compliance
with federal regulations. 98 The conclusion is not surprising.99 Mining is a dy-
namic endeavor that is not easily reduced to a rulebook. Regardless of MSHA's
valiant attempts to regulate every aspect of mining, there will always be count-
less decisions affecting safety that will always remain unregulated.
A separate investigation, which internally investigated MSHA's role in
the accident, concluded that MSHA's regulations did contribute to the acci-
dent. °° MSHA's regulation regarding mine seals, which protect active mining
areas from abandoned mining areas, required the seals to be constructed to a 20
pounds per square inch ("psi") standard.' 0 ' The forces generated by the Sago
mine explosion, which was ignited by the lightning, exceeded 90 psi. 10 2 Thus,
MSHA's standard misjudged the danger to miners by more than a factor of four.
MSHA's misjudgment is not surprising. 1 3 Regulators are prone to the same
errors in judgment as mine operators when decisions are based on imperfect
information. Because regulators are removed from the mine, they have an even
greater propensity than mine operators to under or over estimate hazards.
In light of these inherent deficiencies with regulations that were exem-
plified by the Sago mine disaster, a fair question to ask is whether regulations
are better than the market alternative. In the market-based approach to mine
safety, there are no restrictions on the means by which mine operators achieve
reductions in injuries. The approach to accident reduction depends upon market
96 See ROBERT A. GATES, E7 AL., MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND COAL MINE EXPLOSION, JANUARY 2, 2006, SAGO MINE 1
(2007), available at http://www.msha.gov/fatals/2006/Sago/ftl06C 1-1 2wa.pdf.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 187.
99 Other recent mine disasters have not resulted from violations of regulations. See, e.g., Jim
Walter Res., Inc., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 757 (2005) (A.L.J.), affd in part, Jim Walter Res., Inc., 28
F.M.S.H.R.C. 582 (2006) (vacating contributory violations associated with 2001 disaster that
killed 13 miners); Plateau Mining Corp., 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. 501 (2006) (Commission divided on
whether Willow Creek explosion resulted from violation).
100 See INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 49, at 64.
101 Id. at 61.
102 id. at 63.
103 MSHA also underestimated the risks presented by lightning as a potential ignition source.
See INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 49, at 2.
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forces. The choice between behavior modifications, engineering controls, pro-
duction changes or other means to improve safety is made based on the costs,
benefits, and risks of the various approaches. In making decisions on how to
proceed, the mine operator, guided by its self-interest, will draw on the experi-
ence of its miners, its managers, and the industry in order to tailor a solution that
is appropriate to its operation.
Information about industry-wide experience is typically conveyed
through standards. There is nothing inherently wrong with coal mine safety
standards. Standards are a useful method of conveying information from gen-
eration to generation and from mine to mine. For example, after MSHA re-
cently abdicated its authority to approve sanitary toilets for use in the nation's
coal mines, the coal mining industry now refers to voluntary consensus stan-
dards developed by the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") to
guide it in toilet selection. 104
Consensus standards differ from regulations in one important respect -
they do not have the force and effect of law. When a standard is given the force
and effect of law and becomes a regulation, it either loses its power to convey
information or, alternatively, ends up stifling the innovation that is essential to
improving safety. In this regard, regulations interfere with the market for mine
safety.
1. Generic Means Uninformative
Standards lose their ability to convey information when they are simpli-
fied into regulations that need to be administered and enforced. Many coal mine
safety regulations are "simple and brief in order to be broadly adaptable to myr-
iad circumstances.,
10 5
A good example, especially for persons who are not familiar with coal
mining, is 30 C.F.R. 77.1607(c) (2008).1°6 This is a surface coal mine safety
standard related to speed limits for haulage equipment. It requires that vehicles
used for haulage be operated at speeds that are "prudent and consistent with
conditions of roadway, grades, clearance, visibility, traffic, and the type of
equipment."' 10 7 It does not even attempt to establish a speed limit in terms of
miles per hour because there are so many variables. There is simply too much
information to reduce it to a specific regulation.
104 Up until 2003, mine operators could only install toilets that were approved by MSHA. See
Standards for Sanitary Toilets in Coal Mines, 68 Fed. Reg. 19347, 19347-19350 (Apr. 21, 2003)
(codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 71.500, 1712-16 (2008)).
105 Kerr-McGee Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2496, 2497 (1981).
106 See 30 C.F.R. § 77.1607(c) (2008) ("Equipment operating speeds shall be prudent and con-
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The regulation completely fails as a standard because it provides no use-
ful information. It does not help operators or miners make better decisions
about appropriate speed limits under specific conditions. For example, it does
not state that equipment in a certain weight class should not exceed a certain
speed on a certain grade. It simply restates the obvious - use prudence while
driving. The regulation only exists for the purpose of providing the government
with a basis for meting out punishments.1
0 8
Even though broad regulations exist solely for punishment purposes, en-
forcement of broad and simple regulations is usually problematic.1°9 If 30
C.F.R. § 77.1607(c) was the primary regulation with respect to traffic on public
roadways, then the difficulties would be obvious to most persons. Police in one
jurisdiction might have different perceptions of "prudent" than police in other
jurisdictions. Enforcement would be inconsistent because the "prudent" speed
for a Ferrari owner on a dry road with limited traffic would be different than the
"prudent" speed for a Gremlin owner on wet road in heavy traffic. While rea-
sonable persons can usually agree on the extreme examples, in the vast majority
of circumstances, reasonable people can rightfully disagree as to the "prudent"
speed. Drivers whose "prudence" was second-guessed by police would feel that
they were being singled out and treated unfairly by the government.
The potential for subjective enforcement, as described above, is essen-
tially the problem that has plagued the coal mining industry for almost 40 years.
With respect to simple and broad standards, so-called "violations" are really
nothing more than differences of opinion in many cases. It is not surprising,
therefore, that many of the most frequently cited MSHA regulations are the ones
that are "broad and simple."" 0
The Review Commission has attempted to mitigate the obvious due
process concerns arising from the enforcement of broad and simple standards.
The Commission has held that an "alleged violative condition is appropriately
measured against the standard of whether a reasonably prudent person familiar
with the factual circumstances surrounding the allegedly hazardous condition,
including any facts peculiar to the mining industry, would recognize a hazard
warranting corrective action within the purview of the applicable regulation." 111
The Commission has explained that the reasonably prudent person test is "an
108 See Bluestone Coal Corp., 19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1025, 1032 (1997) ("We also disagree with
Bluestone's argument that the standard applies only in instances where a driver demonstrates a
lack of prudence in operating mobile equipment.").
109 See, e.g., Arch of West Virginia, 23 F.M.S.H.R.C. 447, 451 (2001) (A.L.J) ("The Secretary
asserts that the slow speed of the fuel trucks impedes traffic, causes unsafe passing situations,
limits the maneuverability of the trucks, compromises the safety of larger rock trucks and makes
the drivers unable to control the fuel trucks on slippery roads.").
110 See Most Frequently Cited Standards for 2007, supra note 81.
I Alabama By-Products Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2128, 2131(1982).
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objective measure to determine if a condition is violative of a broadly worded
standard."' 12
While the Commission's reasonable person approach may solve the due
process problem, it has serious shortcomings. The reasonably prudent person
test is not and can never be "objective" because, as set out above, safety is al-
ways subjective. To a large extent, the test merely substitutes the risk prefer-
ences of judges and regulators for the risk preferences of miners and mine op-
erators.
More importantly, the reasonably prudent person test does not convert
the regulation into a useful standard. It merely adds another layer of subjectiv-
ity in that the "prudent" operating speed is determined by a reasonably "pru-
dent" person. In this respect, case by case adjudication provides very little, if
any, future guidance to mine operators. A slightly different set of facts can eas-
ily lead to a completely different result.
In contrast, the market approach does not second-guess the judgment
calls made by miners and mine operators. The market approach trusts the mine
operator to apply enough rock dust to prevent an explosion that might destroy its
mine and kill its workforce.' 3 The market approach trusts the miner to operate
the vehicle at a speed that is consistent with his self-interest of protecting him-
self and his co-workers from injury.' 14 There is no disputing that some of those
decisions will be wrong and result in persons getting hurt. The fallibility of the
market approach is the only thing that it has in common with the forced-
compliance approach." 15
2. Specific Means Restrictive
Not all MSHA regulations are "simple and broad." Some regulations
are very specific. Specific standards do a good job of conveying information to
112 U.S. Steel Mining Co., L.L.C., 27 F.M.S.H.R.C. 435, 440 (2005) ("Under the approach used
by the judge in attempting to apply the reasonably prudent person test, the judge essentially
treated the MSHA expert as the reasonably prudent person, rather than viewing the facts from the
perspective of an objective observer.").
113 Newsome, supra note 18, at Al ("You see there was not one survivor of the explosion but
seventeen (17). The "One Left" crew was in direct line of the explosion within 1,000 feet but
none of them were seriously injured by the blast. Why????? Well, we will tell you why. It was
because the area of the mine was so well rock dusted and maintained that the explosion did not
propagate at all. When it ran out of methane it stopped. Our seventeen (17) miners know how
close they came to death and thank God, MSHA and WVOMHST for their efforts. We also thank
the company (ICG) for their corrective actions that stopped this explosion. Our miners exited the
mine safely in the escape way, which had recently been cleaned, roof bolted and screened.").
114 See Ramar Coal Co., Inc., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1146, 1152 (July 7, 1992) (A.L.J.) ("Truck
driver Austin testified that he had the truck under control, and he denied that he was operating it in
a "reckless manner" on the day in question .... ).
15 See, e.g., Dotson Trucking Co., Inc., 22 F.M.S.H.R.C. 441 (Mar. 30 2000) (A.L.J.) (exis-
tence of standard did not prevent accident resulting from excessive speed).
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mine operators. However, specific standards present an entirely different set of
problems.
One of the primary problems with specific standards is that they are of-
ten complicated. The standards, which are written by lawyers, have to be read
by miners, sometimes while working underground. Some of the standards are
so complicated that it is not clear what is required.' 16 Even MSHA does not
know what the standards mean.' 17 To resolve the ambiguities in MSHA's spe-
cific regulations, the Commission relies on the deference doctrine developed by
the federal courts. 118 Essentially, the deference doctrine provides that if an op-
erator cannot understand the rule written by MSHA, then the rule means what
MSHA says it means." 19
While not all specific regulations promulgated by MSHA are difficult to
understand, one thing that nearly all of them have in common is that they are
wasteful. The waste results from a mine operator's inability to pursue different
methods of achieving the safety purpose of the regulation. 120 The waste is not
always obvious, but it does exist every time that a specific rule is promulgated.
For example, MSHA requires a qualified person to make periodic methane tests
at face areas from under permanent roof support, using extendable probes.'
2'
Such examinations are certainly a good practice. The problem posed by the rule
was that in deep-cut mines, which used roof bolting machines that were
equipped with automated temporary roof supports and methane monitors, taking
a test from under permanent roof support unnecessarily slowed the mining proc-
ess, exposed the miner to back injury associated with using extra long probes,
116 See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Spartan Mining Co., 415 F.3d 82, 83 (D.C. Cir 2005), rev'g
Cannelton Indus., Inc., 26 F.M.S.H.R.C. 146 (2004) (interpreting 30 C.F.R. § 75.360).
117 See, e.g., Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 212 F.3d
1301, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[L]itigation counsel's simultaneous advocacy of several different
positions strongly suggests to us that the Secretary has in fact never grappled with and thus never
exercised her judgment over the conundrum posed by the regulation's clear ambiguity.")
118 See Amax Coal Company, 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1552 (1996) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
119 See Speed Mining, Inc., 28 F.M.S.H.R.C. 773, 782 (2006) (Chairman Duffy concurring and
noting that under federal court precedent, "the Commission engage[s] in a kind of adjudicative
bait-and-switch whereby mine operators are encouraged to appeal matters of law, policy or discre-
tion even though the Commission is powerless to do anything but side with the Secretary.").
120 There is a procedure by which a mine operator may obtain a variance from a MSHA regula-
tion. See 30 C.F.R. § 44 (2008). However, the process, which can take years, is not well suited to
a dynamic industry in which conditions change by the minute. See generally Mettiki Coal, 1999-
MSA-6 (Apr. 7, 2000) (A.L.J.) (two years); Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 1998-MSA-10
(A.L.J. Dec. 15, 1998) (more than a year); and Consolidation Coal Co., 1993-MSA-4 (Apr. 22,
1994) (A.L.J.) (two years); see also International Uranium Corp., 1999-MSA-0003, -0004, -0009
(Mar. 2, 2000) (A.L.J.) (appeals of petition denials by MSHA withdrawn due to mine closure);
LEECO, Inc., 1999-MSA-7 (Dec. 1, 1999) (A.L.J.) (appeal of petition denied by MSHA with-
drawn); Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co., 91-MSA-1 (Aug. 12, 1994) (A.L.J.) (appeal of peti-
tion denied by MSHA withdrawn due to mine ceasing production).
121 30 C.F.R. § 75.362 (pre-2003).
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and potentially offered less reliable methane readings.122 By MSHA's own con-
servative estimates, requiring mine operators to take the methane test from un-
der permanent roof supports wasted about $6.6 million dollars per year.23 Even
though the inefficiency was brought to MSHA's attention as early as 1998,
MSHA did not amend the rule - to allow methane tests to be made by sweeping
a probe in by the last roof support - until 2003.124 In a market approach, where
one-size-fits-all rules are not required, these inefficiencies do not exist. Opera-
tors have the freedom to tailor their practices to meet the safety concerns pre-
sented by the specific mine.
In addition to being wasteful, specific regulations discourage innova-
tion. While specific regulations are intended to establish a minimum level of
safety for mines, more often than not, regulations establish the maximum level
of safety. The so-called rule-bound mentality exists because the prospect of
future regulations discourages innovation. An early adopter or innovator runs
the risk of having its investment in safety made obsolete by a regulation that
specifically mandates a different approach. For example, personal emergency
devices ("PEDs"), which, among other things, can be used to send one-way text
messages to underground miners in the event of an emergency, have been com-
mercially available since the early 1990s. A PED system, if it survived the ex-
plosion, might have been able to get a message to the Sago miners instructing
them to evacuate the mine. MSHA does not require the use of PEDs. 125 As a
result, only a handful of underground coal mines in the United States use the
technology. One of the primary reasons for the low adoption rate in the United
States is the fear that MSHA might ultimately mandate an alternative type of
communication system. MSHA is currently evaluating several competing tech-
nologies, such as two-way texting. 126 If the agency ultimately decides to man-
date a different technology, the early adopters will lose their investment in the
PED systems that they have already installed.
While miner advocates have been critical of MSHA for the delay in
adopting an emergency communication regulation, 127 the problem is not with
MSHA but with regulation in general. One of the primary disadvantages of
122 Coal Mine Safety & Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 60611-16 (Sept. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 75) (2008)).
123 Id. at 60615.
124 Id. at 60611.
125 Coal Mine Safety & Health, 68 Fed. Reg. 53037, 53041 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pts. 48 & 75) (2008)).
126 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin., MSHA Aggressively Assessing, Test-
ing Communication and Locating Devices for Underground Mines 1 3 (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20060218.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter MSHA Aggressively Assessing].
127 Ken Ward, Jr., Bush, MSHA Cast Aside Text Devices: Technology might have saved W. Va.
miners' lives, CHARLESTON GAzErE, Jan. 29, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.saturdaygazettemail.comnews/the+sago+mine+disaster/200601290010.
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Soviet-style central planning is that MSHA has to adopt approaches that will
work in all mines. 28 In contrast, the market approach is flexible and allows
mine operators to adopt technologies that work best in their specific mines.
Moreover, the market approach offers the additional advantage of real
world competition between technologies. In the market, exchanges between
technology companies and mine operators would ultimately sort out which
technology solution is best for each mine. This has definite advantages over
industry-wide rules based on laboratory findings which, as Sago shows, can lead
to disastrous results. 1
29
B. Inspections Versus Audits
In the year preceding the Sago mine disaster, MSHA inspected the Sago
mine 154 out of 365 days.' 30 In the quarter preceding the disaster, a federal in-
spector was at the Sago mine thirty-nine times.' 31 A MSHA inspector was at the
Sago mine on December 27, 2005, just six days prior to the explosion. 132 While
a subsequent internal review of MSHA's inspection activity at the Sago mine
revealed some minor deficiencies in the inspections performed by MSHA, in
general, the Sago mine had been inspected as intended by the Mine Act.
133
While the level of federal involvement at the Sago mine was ordinary
by MSHA standards, it was extraordinary compared to any other industry.
There is no other industry in the United States that can expect to see a federal
inspector more than one out of every three days. Despite this fact, following the
Sago mine disaster, many called for an even greater federal presence in the na-
tion's mines. 34 Some forced-compliance advocates, particularly those who
measure the success of a government program in terms of how much public
resources it consumes, argued that more government spending is required on
mine safety enforcement.
35
128 NAT'L MINING Assoc., TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL PEELISH, SENIOR V.P., SAFETY & HUM.
RESOURCES FOUND. COAL CORP. ON BEHALF OF NAT'L. MINING Assoc.: HEARING BEFORE THE S.
COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. AND PENSIONS, 109TH CONG. 3-5 (2006) [hereinafter TESTIMONY
OF MICHAEL PEELISH], available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2006-03-02/ Pellish.pdf ("My
hope is that realistic expectations of what is technologically achievable drive whatever require-
ments become either law or "Best Practice" in the industry.").
129 INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 49, at 55-56 (MSHA 20 psi seal standard based on Bureau of
Mines' laboratory tests).
130 Id. at 11-13.
131 Id. at 4.
132 Id. at 140.
133 Id.
134 See Posting of Scott Shields, How Bush Failed the Sago 13, to
http://www.mydd.com/story/2006/l/3/9491278006 (Jan. 3, 2006, 9:49:12 EST).
135 See CHRISTOPHER W. SHAW, UNDERMINING SAFETY: A REPORT ON COAL MINE SAFETY,
CENTER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW (2008), available at
http://www.csrl.org/reportsUnderminingSafety.pdf; Daniel Goode, Senators Say Mine Safety
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The call for a greater federal presence in the nation's mines is ironic.
Greater federal presence could not have prevented the Sago mine disaster. Even
though the MSHA inspectors had specifically examined the mine seals that
failed at Sago, the seals complied with the 20 psi limit set out in MSHA's regu-
lations. 136 Although MSHA inspectors have authority to close mines for non-
violative imminently dangerous conditions, 37 neither the inspector that was at
the mine on December 27, 2005, nor anyone else could have foreseen the cir-
cumstances that triggered the January 2, 2006 explosion. Prior to the Sago dis-
aster, the information that might have prevented the accident did not exist.
The problem with federal inspections is not that there is not enough fed-
eral inspection activity at the nation's mines, but rather that there may be too
much inspection activity. Admittedly, it is unorthodox to suggest that safety
inspections may be detrimental. According to safety clichd, "another set of
eyes" is always considered beneficial.
To understand the detriment of a substantial inspector presence at un-
derground coal mines, it is important to understand how inspections would be
performed in a free market. In a free market, miners and insurance companies
have significant incentives to verify that a mine operator is operating a safe
mine. An individual miner has a strong incentive to provide for his own safety
and even the safety of his co-workers. The insurance company has a strong
incentive to minimize losses at the mine. Typically, the miner focuses on haz-
ards in his workplace, while the insurer focuses risks to the entire mine.
While neither miners nor insurance auditors are precluded from per-
forming inspections under the Mine Act, the vigilance of insurers and miners is
diminished by the extent of federal involvement.' 38 The principle that reduces
the vigilance is akin to what is commonly referred to as a moral hazard. A mor-
al hazard exists when a party that perceives itself as insulated from risk behaves
differently from the way it would behave if it perceived full exposure to the risk.
While any type of audit has the potential to create a false sense of security and
lull miners into complacency, 39 the lulling effect of inspections by government
Agency Needs More Money, CONG. DAILY, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0106/012306cdpml.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also
OMB Watch, Coal Mine Safety Shortchanged by Years of Budget Cuts, Vol. 9, No. 4 OMB
WATCH, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4177/l1851?TopiclD=2 (last
visited Sept. 18, 2008) ("A direct correlation between MSHA's budget and coal mine safety may
not exist, but recent evidence indicates resource constraints are making it more difficult for
MSHA to conduct oversight and enforcement activity and to write the rules that protect miners.").
136 See INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 49, at 57.
137 30 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2006).
138 Ruffennach, supra note 6, at 27-29.
139 JULE BARR, LAURENTIAN UNIV., INCO LTD. (A), HEALTH AND SAFETY IN
MINING 5 (2004), available at
http://www.safetymanagementeducation.com/en/data/files/download/Documents/inco%201evack
%20part%20A.pdf (critique of metal mine operator internal audit which "created a false sense of
security, which was often accompanied by increased complacency.").
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can be expected to be greater since the government, unlike an insurer, is per-
ceived as unbiased.
In the case of miners, they have every reason to believe that it is the
federal government's job to insulate them from workplace risk. With the sole
exception of carrying smoking materials into underground coal mines,"40 the
Mine Act does not hold miners liable for safety violations, even deliberate
ones.14 1 The Mine Act states "the first priority and concern of all in the coal or
other mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious re-
source-the miner."' 42 Because a miner might see a federal inspector one out of
every three days, it is certainly reasonable for a miner to be lulled into a false
sense of security.
Although whether or not MSHA's inspection activities have lessened
the vigilance of miners has not been studied, there are anecdotal cases that illus-
trate the point. In Olson v. United States, for example, two metal miners who
were permanently disabled by a roof fall at an underground metal mine sued
MSHA for negligent inspection. 143 Prior to the accident, miners at the mine had
called MSHA six times to report roof hazards. 44 MSHA did not investigate the
complaints. 145  During MSHA's quarterly inspection, the barricaded areas,
which had been highlighted in the complaints, were not inspected. 46 A roof fall
subsequently occurred in an uninspected area, killing one miner and disabling
the two miners who brought suit. 147 The case shows the extreme level to which
miners depend on MSHA to protect their safety. Instead of taking matters into
their own hands, the concerned miners opted to rely on MSHA to provide for
their safety.
C. Punishment Versus Cooperation
In the year preceding the Sago mine disaster, MSHA issued 208 cita-
tions to the mine operator. 48 Every citation had to be abated or fixed by the
operator, even if the operator did not agree with the allegation of non-
compliance. 49 MSHA also issued 16 closure orders at the Sago mine.' 50 Every
140 30 U.S.C. § 820(g) (2006).
141 See Fort Scott Fertilizer-Cullor, Inc., 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1112 (1995) (operator liable for
employee misconduct).
142 30 U.S.C. § 802 (2006).





148 INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 49, at 20.
149 Operators that do not abate violations in the time specified by the MSHA inspector are
subject to closure orders and $6,500 per day penalties. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(b) & 820(b) (2006).
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closure order imposed tangible costs on the operator in terms of lost produc-
tion.1 51 On top of this, MSHA assessed the operator over $24,000 in fines.
152
Immediately following the Sago disaster, advocates of the "safety
through laws" paradigm immediately inferred that even greater enforcement
must be required to prevent a reoccurrence of the accident.153 Seizing on public
sentiment, Congress hastily enacted the MINER Act, which strengthened
MSHA enforcement authority, on June 15, 20 06 .15 MSHA, on its own initia-
tive, amended its civil penalty regulations to provide for significantly higher
penalties per violation on March 22, 2007.155 Both measures became law before
MSHA even issued its Report of Investigation on May 9, 2007, which con-
cluded that the Sago mine disaster was not the result of non-compliance with
regulations. 1
56
Now that dust has settled, it is fair to ask whether the knee-jerk reac-
tions to the disaster are going to improve mine safety. The probable outcome is
that the complicated system of punishment will make relations between MSHA
and mine operators even more adversarial than they were in the past. The ad-
versity will likely slow the flow of safety information from government to the
market participants. The only certainty is that there will be plenty of work for
lawyers.
1. Unmeasured Means Ineffective
The recently implemented changes to the Mine Act penalty process are
primarily monetary in nature. Congress raised the maximum civil penalty from
$60,000 to $220,000 for a new class of violations known as "flagrant., 157 None
150 INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 49, at 20 & Appendix E.
151 Thomas Frank, Senators Urge Bigger Fines for Mines, USA TODAY 5, Feb. 2, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-03-02-mine-investigation-x.htm
(quoting MSHA Administrator David Dye saying "Closure orders are your biggest hammer ....
Shutting down portions of a mine until it is deemed safe can cost up to $150,000 in lost coal pro-
duction.")
152 Mine Safety and Health Admin., Questions and Answers on the Sago Mine Accident (2007)
http://www.msha.gov/sagomine/sagoqaOl182006.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
153 Editorial, Coal is King, But Its Queen is Safety, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 5, 2006
("Early reports on the causes for this week's accident indicate a need for state and federal inspec-
tors to be given greater enforcement tools when a company shows a pattern of neglect in not tak-
ing all necessary safety precautions."); see also supra note 132.
154 See Press Release, President Bush Signs S.2803, the Miner Act of 2006 (June 15, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060615-2.html.
155 See Press Release from the Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
U.S. Dep't of Labor's MSHA to Publish Final Rule on Civil Penalties (Mar. 21, 2007), available
at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/msha20070398.htm.
156 See GATES, supra note 96.
157 Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L. No.
109-236, § 8, 120 Stat. 493, 501 (2006) ("Violations under this section that are deemed to be
flagrant may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $220,000. For purposes of the preceding
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of the pre-disaster Sago mine violations would have been impacted by the new
provision. The more significant changes to the punishment component were
made by MSHA. 158 MSHA modified its penalty schedule to increase fines for all
violations. These changes would have increased the pre-disaster penalties as-
sessed at Sago from $24,000 to about $82,000.159 Under the new penalty rule,
MSHA assessed about $75 million in calendar year 2007 across all mining in-
dustries, which is a substantial increase over the $25 million collected in the
year before the Sago disaster.'
60
MSHA predicted that the substantial increase in penalties would lead to
greater compliance. In fact, MSHA went so far as to explain that "each 10%
increase in penalty for a violation is associated with a 3% decrease in its prob-
ability of occurrence.' 161 However, it turns out that there was no science, or
even an attempt at science, behind MSHA's estimate. In the Preliminary Eco-
nomic Regulatory Analysis for the proposed penalty change, MSHA conceded
that the agency "performed no studies to estimate the size of this effect." 162 In
other words, the cause and effect relationship was assumed and the estimate was
made-up. 163
The complete lack of any science is one of the primary problems with
the concept of using monetary penalties to motivate compliance activity. No
one has ever calculated the market incentives to maintain a safe mine and com-
sentence, the term 'flagrant' with respect to a violation means a reckless or repeated failure to
make reasonable efforts to eliminate a known violation of a mandatory health or safety standard
that substantially and proximately caused, or reasonably could have been expected to cause, death
or serious bodily injury."). MSHA subsequently raised the maximum penalty for non-flagrant
violations from $60,000 to $70,000 based on a cost of living adjustment. 73 Fed. Reg. No. 26
(Feb. 7 2008).
158 The agency also began using its pattern of violations authority which had lain dormant for
many years prior to Sago. See Press Release, Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. De-
partment of Labor, MSHA Puts 16 Mine Operators on Notice for Potential Pattern of Violations
(June 17, 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20080794.htm.
159 This is a rough estimate based on the 243% increase predicted by MSHA's impact state-
ment. See MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR PROPOSED ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL
PENALTIES (2006) 20 TABLE IV-8 [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS],
available at http://www.msha.gov/REGS/REA/06-7512CivilPenalties.pdf. The estimate underes-
timates the impact of the penalty increase.
160 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NUMBER OF PENALTIES ASSESSED
AND PERCENT CONTESTED: JANUARY 2005 - JUNE 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.msha.gov/STATS/ContestedCitations/Civil%2Penalties%20Assessed%20and%2OCo
ntested.pdf.
161 Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 71 Fed. Reg. 174,
53065 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100).
162 PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 159 at 15.
163 In the preamble to the final civil penalty rule, MSHA essentially conceded that it had no
evidence that raising penalties would increase compliance. See Criteria and Procedures for Pro-
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pared the incentives to the penalties being assessed by MSHA. In all likelihood,
the amount paid in risk premiums, workers' compensation premiums, insurance
costs and other accident related costs dwarfs the $75 million in penalties that
MSHA assessed in calendar year 2007. For example, in 2006 the International
Coal Group took a $13 million charge, which was almost 50% of the total 2005
penalties assessed by MSHA, related to costs associated with the Sago acci-
dent. 164 In this perspective, it is doubtful that $75 million spread across thou-
sands of mining companies in multiple industries is going to result in safer
mines.
2. Subjective Means Unpredictable
In addition to the proportion problem, the other problem with the Mine
Act's penalty system, as currently and formerly implemented by MSHA, is its
subjectivity. Under the Mine Act, penalties are based on six criteria: the history
of previous violations, the size of the business, the operator's negligence, the
ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated
good faith of the operator charged in achieving abatement. 65 The gravity and
negligence criterion are highly subjective, even more so than the findings of
violation that the inspector is required to make with respect to the broad and
simple regulations.
There are four primary gravity findings that a MSHA inspector is re-
quired to make. 16 6 First, the inspector is required to forecast the likelihood of
the violation resulting in an injury. The inspector can choose between no likeli-
hood, unlikely, reasonably likely, highly likely, and occurred. Second, the in-
spector is required to predict the severity of the injury that might result from the
violation by choosing between no lost work days, lost work days, permanently
disabling, or fatal. Third, the inspector is required to estimate how many per-
sons might be injured. Fourth, the inspector is required, based on the first two
findings, to designate the violation as significant and substantial ("S&S") or not
"S&S."
1 67
Contrary to what might be the popular perception, science plays abso-
lutely no role in any aspect of the gravity determination. The Commission has
specifically rejected the notion that gravity determinations should be based on
probabilities. 168 The Commission has not even provided a useful definition of
164 INT'L COAL GROUP, INC., BUILDING A STRONG FUTURE, ANNUAL REPORT 77, available at
http://www.intlcoal.comlpages/investorsIlCO2007AR.pdf.
165 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(1)(B) (2006).
166 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e) (2008).
167 See Mathies Coal Company, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1, 3-4 (1984); see also Elk Run Coal Co., Inc.,
28 F.M.S.H.R.C. 190 (2006).
168 See AMAX Coal Co., 19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 846, 849-51 (1997) (rejecting "more probable than
not"); see also United States Steel Mining Co., Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 862, 864-7 (1996) (same);
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the term "reasonably likely.' 69 So, except in the rare cases where an injury has
already occurred at the time citation is issued, these gravity determinations are
nothing more than the opinion of just one person as to whether or not a violation
"could" lead to an injury.1 70 Because very few MSHA inspectors are profes-
sional risk managers, most are not qualified to make such gravity determina-
tions.17  Thus, when persons talk about a "significant and substantial" violation,
all they are really talking about is a check mark on a piece of paper.
The so-called "negligence" determination is equally problematic. The
"negligence" criterion is actually an assignment of fault based on the behavior
of the mine operator.172 The Mine Act defines four types of violations that are
characterized by the mine operator's behavior: "negligent,' ' 73 "unwarrantable
failure,"'174 "knowing"'175 and "willful.' ' 176 As indicated above, the MINER Act
added a new fifth category of "flagrant." Over 96% of all violations issued by
MSHA at underground coal mines fall in the "negligent" category, 177 which
see also Energy West Mining Company, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1836,1837-38 (1993) (rejecting "sub-
stantial possibility").
169 Sec'y of Labor v. United States Steel Mining Co., Inc., 18 F.M.S.H.R.C. 862, 868-69 (1996)
(Marks, J., concurring) ("The parties' conflict is understandable because the term 'reasonable
likelihood' may convey different meanings. To U.S. Steel, the word 'likelihood' governs, and the
term 'reasonable likelihood' means 'more probable than not.' To the Secretary, the word 'reason-
able' modifies 'likelihood' to mean a reasonable potential, not 'more probable than not."'); see
also the "significant and substantial" phrase in Sections 104(d) and (e) of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977; Interpretive Bulletin, 63 Fed. Reg. 24, 6012 (Feb. 5, 1998) (withdrawn
MSHA interpretive bulletin); see also Cement Div., National Gypsum Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 822
(1981) (Lawson, J., dissenting) ("To recast the statute in terms of the significance or substantiality
of the hazard, and the predicted result thereof, is simply not in accord with either the English
language or the language of the Act.").
170 See, e.g., Twentymile Coal Co., 26 F.M.S.H.R.C. 666, 680 (2004); see also Zeigler Coal
Co., 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 949, 953-54 (1993) (reasoning that the judge's several uses of the word
"could" in his analysis are not sufficient grounds for reversing his S&S determination). But see
Zeigler at 953-54 ("[S]tatements that such events could occur, standing alone, do not support a
finding that there was a reasonable likelihood of an ignition.").
171 See 30 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). But see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MSHA's
REVISED HIRING PROCESS HAS IMPROVED THE AGENCY'S RECRUITING EFFORTS, BUT ITS HUMAN
CAPITAL STRATEGIC PLAN DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROJECT OR ADDRESS ITS FUTURE WORKFORCE
NEEDS, 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07704r.pdf ("5 years of practical
experience is preferred, but not required").
172 Emery Mining Corp., 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1997, 2000 (1987) ("increasingly severe sanctions for
increasingly serious ... operator behavior" (quoting Cement Division, National Gypsum, Co., 3
F.M.S.H.R.C. 822, 828 (1981))).
173 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(1)(B) (2006).
174 Id. § 814(d) (2006).
175 Id. § 820(c) & (d) (2006).
176 Id. § 820(d)
177 INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 49, at 24 (table).
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connotates unintentional conduct.1 78 This may come as shock to most forced-
compliance advocates who often ascribe evil motives to mine operators. While
penalties might be presumed to deter intentional conduct, it is questionable
whether penalties can effectively deter the "ordinary negligence" that character-
izes most MSHA violations.1
79
Evidently, MSHA was not satisfied with the four categories of behav-
iors established by the Mine Act. In promulgating its civil penalty regulations
to implement the Mine Act, MSHA created five additional categories of punish-
able behavior. These categories include "no negligence," "low negligence,"
"moderate negligence,"' 180 "high negligence," 181 and "reckless disregard." 182
Even though there are now nine total classifications of behavior, it does mean
that the process of assigning fault is an easy one. Assigning blame, which en-
tails making determinations about motives and justifications for behaviors, is
highly subjective. 183
The one category that deserves special mention is "no negligence." The
category of "no negligence," which accounts for about 3% of underground coal
mine violations, is reserved for no-fault violations.184 The Mine Act has been
interpreted as imposing liability without fault. 85 MSHA must cite and penalize
an operator even if the operator could not prevent the violation.1 86 It is not clear
178 Emery Mining Corp., 9 F.M.S.H.R.C 1997, 2001 (1987) (defining "negligence" as "the
failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use and is characterized
by 'inadvertence,' 'thoughtlessness,' and 'inattention."').
179 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 99. ("When there is a willingness to do the right thing,
across-the-board punishment is simply not the best strategy for maximizing compliance ... this is
the very mistake that the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Act perpetuates."). See, e.g., Westmore-
land Coal Co., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1338, 1344 (1985) (affirming violation despite "the repeated ef-
forts to remove the formation and the consequent good faith belief on the part of all concerned
that the formation posed no hazard").
180 30 C.F.R. 100.3(d) (2008) ("mitigating circumstances" v. "considerable mitigating circum-
stances").
181 Mettiki Coal Corp., 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 760, 770 (1991) ("The Commission has not precisely
defined what constitutes ordinary, high or gross negligence."); see also Eastern Associated Coal
Corp., 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 178, 187 (1991) ("high negligence" is "an aggravated lack of care that is
more than ordinary negligence.").
182 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d) (2008).
183 See, e.g., Lafarge Construction Materials and Theodore Dress, 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1140
(1998) (majority stating that the operator "demonstrated a serious lack of reasonable care") (dis-
sent stating that the operator "had no reason to believe its procedures were inadequate").
184 INTERNAL REvtEw, supra note 49, at 24.
185 See Sewell Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 686 F.2d 1066 (4th
Cir. 1982); see also Allied Products Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 666
F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1982).
186 See, e.g., Rushton Mining Co., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 249 (1988) (holding that the operator vio-
lated the Mine Act based on an undiscovered defect in wire rope); see also Basin Resources Inc.,
19 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1565 (1997) (A.L.J.) (holding that the operator violated the Mine Act by not
providing additional ground support even though hazardous conditions had just occurred).
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how no-fault liability can motivate compliance given that the "no negligence"
finding implies that there was no ability to control the conditions in the first
place.
The negligence and gravity designations made by the inspector on the
citation equate to penalty points, which are used to calculate the fine for the
violation. 187 However, because gravity, negligence and, in many cases, the find-
ing of violation are incredibly subjective and even arbitrary, there is no way for
operators to predict penalties prior to the issuance of a citation. Since the pen-
alty assessment costs cannot be estimated in advance, they cannot be factored
into decisions about investments in accident prevention programs. Therefore,
the effectiveness of penalties as an incentive for compliance is either minimal or
non-existent. In this regard, it is of little surprise that MSHA's prediction that
the recent increased penalties would result in fewer citations being issued has
not materialized - citations for non-compliance were 15% higher in 2007 de-
spite the higher penalties.1
88
3. Adversarial Means Uninformed
The one change that has resulted from MSHA's renewed emphasis on
punishment following the Sago disaster is an increase in cases filed before the
Commission. Since March 2007, when the penalty increase was implemented,
the percentage of cases involving citations being contested has risen from about
5% to well over 20%.189 This consequence, which MSHA completely failed to
consider in its civil penalty rulemaking, was totally predictable. The system
created by the Coal Act and modified by the Mine Act, which required penalties
first instance violations, intended that the citation itself be a form of punish-
ment.' 90 By raising the penalty for a low gravity violations from $60 to $600 in
many instances and $6000 in some instances, 191 MSHA created financial incen-
187 30 C.F.R. § 100.4 (2008).
188 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AT A GLANCE
(2008), available at http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/mshafctI0.htm [hereinafter MINE
SAFETY AT A GLANCE]; see also CNNMoney.com, Coal Producers Say Regulations Cutting
Production (Sept. 2, 2008), available at
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/apwire/f331 e003e44e4cea0533197fac5b600e.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (indicating that MSHA citations are up another eight percent more cita-
tions in 2008).
189 MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NUMBER OF PENALTIES ASSESSED
AND PERCENT CONTESTED JANUARY 2005 - JUNE 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.msha.gov/STATS/ContestedCitations/Civi%20Penalties%20Assessed%20and%2OCo
ntested.pdf.
190 See Sewell Coal Co. 686 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1982) (Widner, J., dissenting) ("A fine must be
said to be an adverse consequence of considerable import regardless of its amount.").
191 Under MSHA's prior civil penalty rule, all non S&S violations were assessed a $60 fine. 30
C.F.R. 100.4 (2006). Under MSHA's new civil penalty conversion table, there are a number of
point combinations by which an operator could be fined $6,000 for a citation that was designated
non S&S. 30 C.F.R. § 100.4. See, e.g., Michael T. Heenan, Inspector Decisions You Pay For, PIT
[Vol. I111
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tives for operators to challenge the subjective findings made by the MSHA in-
spectors. 92 For the first time in history, the mine safety and health bar can now
litigate cases against MSHA with a reasonable opportunity of having penalty
savings exceed legal fees.
The complicated system of punishment would be laughable, if it did not
come at a heavy price. The operator's fear of compliance liability eliminates the
dialogue between the operator and the government regarding safety. 193 Because
MSHA inspectors are required by law to penalize the operator for first instance
violations and, in certain circumstances, shut down the areas of the mine, 194 the
inspectors are seldom privy to the safety concerns of the mine operator. In
many cases, the only information provided to the inspector by the mine operator
is the information that is required to be provided by law. 195 Just like taxpayers
do not turn to the IRS for accounting advice, mine operators do not look to
MSHA inspectors for safety advice.
The ever-present prospect of enforcement impairs the flow of informa-
tion from MSHA as well. For example, following the Crandall Canyon disaster,
MSHA argued "that allowing the media to be present during the interviews may
damage the integrity of the investigation by conveying ... information regard-
ing potential civil or criminal violations."' 196 Thus, because punishment pits
government and industry as legal adversaries, it impairs the government's abil-
ity to affect safety with information.
The market approach to mine safety depends on fully informed market
participants. Traditionally, the dominant information provider has been the fed-
eral government. As long as the government and the industry are pitted as ad-
versaries over subjective determinations on a piece of paper, the government
will be less able to affect safety with information.
& QUARRY, January 1, 2008, available at
http://www.pitandquarry.com/pitandquarry/Law/Inspector-decisions-you-pay-
for/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/484473.
192 Michael T. Heenan, Challenges to Civil Penalties, PIT & QUARRY, July 9, 2008, available at
http://www.pitandquarry.com/pitandquarry/Features/Challenges-to-civil-
penalties/ArticleStandardlArticle/detail/528676 ("When penalties were lower, they might decide
to pay the penalties and move on. Today, operators are finding that such an approach does not
work.")
193 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 59, at 99 ("The threat of punishment can have a chilling effect on
the information-gathering process.").
194 30 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2008).
195 MARK N. SAvrr, Do I HAVE TO GIVE THEM THAT? A PRIMER ON DOCuMENTS (2003), avail-
able at http://www.pattonboggs.com/news/detail.aspx?news=162 ("First, before you decide
whether or not to produce the documents [to MSHA], you must carefully review the documents to
determine the consequences of their production. If all of the information contained in the docu-
ments is favorable, you may wish to provide them. If not, you may wish to explore other op-
tions.").
196 Salt Lake Tribune Kearns Tribune, LLC v. Chao, No. 2:07-CV-739, slip. op. at 8 (D. Utah
Oct. 9, 2007).
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X. FORCED-COMPLIANCE AND SCARCE RESOURCES
In the Sago mine disaster, twelve people died. There is no dispute about
the magnitude of the tragedy or its devastating impact on the families, friends
and communities of the deceased miners. In any discussion of public policy,
however, it is essential to dehumanize the tragedy. It is essential to view each
loss of life as a statistic, not as a person. Even though every statistic represents
a person, putting faces on the numbers, as some have argued, 197 leads down the
slippery slope of having to compare the value of human lives. Does an adult
coal miner deserve more government resources than a child with cancer? Or,
assuming that the discussion is arbitrarily confined to the allocation of resources
to protect workers, do coal miners deserve more government resources than
truck drivers or fishermen? These rhetorical questions exemplify the necessity
of dehumanizing the problem.
To avoid comparisons between coal miners and other persons on a hu-
man level, some have proposed that dedicating government resources to coal
mine safety is important from an energy policy perspective. Currently, coal
powers 50% of the electricity generating facilities in the United States. Coal
resources in the United States are abundant and do not present the same geopo-
litical risks as oil. Therefore, the argument goes, it is essential to keep mines
safe to in order to protect society's supply of electricity.198 Because miners do
this important work, the government ought to protect them. The problem with
this approach is that it is still based on values. Without loggers, for example,
there would be no paper with which to commit the debate to writing.
Once free of the constraints of value judgments, it is possible to com-
pare the benefits of the forced-compliance approach to the costs of the forced-
compliance approach. As might be expected based on the inherent defects in
the forced-compliance model, the marginal or non-existent benefits certainly do
not outweigh the very substantial costs. Because there are uncertain benefits
and certain costs, advocates of the forced-compliance model should bear the
burden of proving that resources should continue to be committed to command
and control style regulation.
197 See Patrick McGinley, Pits and the Pendulum: Mine Safety Law Enforcement and Behavior
Modification in American Coal Mines, Thinking Outside the Box: A Post-Sago Look at Coal
Mine Safety, http://lawschoolcoalconference.event.wvu.edu/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (sympo-
sium webcast available).
198 See e.g H.R. REp. No. 91-563, at 2507 (1969) ("Coal is our most abundant fuel resource.
Right now, it supplies nearly a fourth of our total energy demand and every forecast, whether by
Government or the private sector, indicates that coal must continue to play a significant role if this
country's future energy requirements are to be satisfied."); see also Lofaso, supra note 1, at 1.
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A. Uncertain Benefits
The popular perception, as evidenced by post-Sago legislative and regu-
latory action, is that forced-compliance improves mine safety. However, there
is a dearth of evidence to support the popular perception. If there is any safety
benefit resulting from forced-compliance, it is almost certainly a very small one
in terms of lives saved.
With respect to newly proposed regulations, MSHA often attempts to
calculate the benefit of the regulation in terms of lives saved. For example,
MSHA predicts that one of the new post-Sago requirements, installing refuge
chambers in underground coal mines, will save between 0.5 to 1.5 lives per
year.199 The huge problem with MSHA's generous estimate is that the agency
relied on data that went back to 1900 when explosions were common and, there-
fore, is based on lives that are no longer in danger today. The dubiousness of
the 1.5 lives saved estimate is obvious given that there are only about 30 lives
per year that remain to be saved in the entire coal mining industry (surface and
underground) and only 14% of those underground lives are lost due to explo-
sions or fires.200 In addition, MSHA's calculation does not factor into the esti-
mate any potential loss of lives resulting from the rule, which may result from
the work involved with getting the chambers underground or from the risk com-
pensation created by the perception of potentially improved rescue outcomes. 201
Despite these substantial shortcomings, MSHA's effort is nonetheless an at-
tempt to quantify the benefit of a safety regulation, which is certainly a step in
the right direction.
With respect to the older MSHA coal mine safety regulations, however,
there are no attempted benefit estimates. Most of MSHA's rules were promul-
gated at a time when it was simply assumed that regulations were beneficial.2 °2
Even though the purported benefit of these rules has never been examined on an
individual basis, MSHA has inferred a benefit from their enforcement based on
aggregate fatality trends, which show that coal mine fatalities have declined
199 Refuge Alternative for Underground Coal Mines, 73 Fed. Reg. 116, 34164 (June 16, 2008)
(to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 75).
200 MSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF MINING FATALITIES BY WORK
LOCATION BY TYPE OF INCIDENT 2001-2005, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/images/cb6.gif.
201 See TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL PEELISH, supra note 128, at 3 ("It is not sound safety practice to
encourage a false sense of security."); see also Metzgar, supra note 25.
202 All of the original underground coal mine safety standards would have escaped regulatory
analysis because they were based on standards enacted by Congress. See e.g,. 30 U.S.C. 861-77
(2006). Moreover, and in any event, regulatory analysis did not get started until after 1974, at
which time most of the underground coal standards were already codified. Furthermore, nearly all
of the coal mine safety regulations would have escaped regulatory analysis because their individ-
ual impact on the economy is estimated not exceed $100 million. See generally OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/chapl.html.
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since the Coal Act was enacted in 1969 and since the Mine Act was enacted in
1977.203
The obvious problem with MSHA's simplistic presentations, which fuel
popular perception, is that coal mine fatalities also declined substantially prior
to 1969, from 3242 in 1907 to 203 in 1969.2 4 Some commentators have rebut-
ted that the very steep pre-1969 decline is attributable to earlier coal mine safety
laws, which became "progressively stronger., 20 5 The problem with this line of
argument is that coal mine fatalities started to decline well before anything ap-
proximating modem forced-compliance was put into practice. Civil and cimi-
nal sanctions for first-instance violations were not introduced until 1969. More-
over, the two published empirical studies did not find any connection between
increased federal regulatory powers and mine safety through 1965 or 1970. 206
There have been a few empirical studies that have attributed a safety
benefit to the 1969 Coal Act based on aggregate trends in injuries and/or fatali-
ties. Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980)207 and Weeks and Fox (1995)208 attribute
success to forced-compliance because the downward trend in coal mine injuries
continued or accelerated after 1969. Neumann and Nelson (1982)2 09 and Fuess
and Loewenstein (1990)210 infer an effect of forced-compliance on mine safety
because injuries are lower in the post-MSHA period. Kneisner and Leeth
(2003)21 and Boden (1985)212 have both correctly criticized the aggregated data
203 See e.g., MSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 25 YEARS OF SUCCESS, available at
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAInfo/25Years/MSHA%2025%20Years.pdf; see also MINE SAFETY
ATA GLANCE, supra note 188.
2W Ruffennach, supra note 5, at 3, 7.
205 J. Davittt McAteer, The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977: Preserving a Law that
Works, 98 W. VA. L. REV.1105, 1110 (1996) ("Progressively stronger coal mine safety legislation
was enacted in 1941, 1952, 1969 and 1977. Legislation addressing safety in metal and non-metal
mines was enacted in 1966 and 1977. The connection between stronger laws and safer mines has
been carefully documented by scholars").
206 See William H. Andrews & Charles L. Christenson, Some Economic Factors Affecting Safe-
ty in Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 40 S. ECON. J. 364 (1974); see also Thomas S. Witt,
Catherine P. Palombra & Neil A. Palombra, Comment, Some Economic Factors Affecting Safety
in Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 42 S. ECON. J. 306 (1975).
207 Michael S. Lewis-Black & John R. Alford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal
Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 745,745-56 (1980).
208 James L. Weeks & Maier Fox, Fatality Rate and Regulatory Policies in Bituminous Coal
Mining, United States, 1951-1981, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1278, 1278-80 (1983).
2W- See generally George R. Neumann & Jon P. Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size:
Effects of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, XXV J. LAw AND ECON. 183 (1982).
210 Scott M. Feuss, Jr. & Mark A Loewenstein, Further Analysis of the Theory of Economic
Regulation: The Case of the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 354, 354-
89 (1990).
211 Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Ef-
forts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New Health Policy Implications, 29 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 83, 83-111 (2004).
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approach because it does not account for the general background trend in mine
injuries/fatalities and because it does not account for the affect of other histori-
cal variables that also affect mine safety.
Kniesner and Leeth avoid some of the problems associated with looking
at aggregated trends by using an econometric regression analysis. Although
Kniesner and Leeth did find a safety benefit associated with the forced-
compliance of mine safety regulations, it is essential to keep in mind that their
analysis was "deliberately biased upwards, so as to find maximal MSHA ef-
fects." '213 With the limited exception of their "cherry picked results," they noted
that "the results in the overwhelming number of cases are unfavorable to the
safety enhancement objective of MSHA at current levels of regulation." 214
The other important criticism of the empirical studies is that they focus
on fatality rates that are not representative of safety in the coal mining indus-
try.21 5 Although the fatalities per 100,000 workers is a rate that is widely ac-
cepted for comparisons between industries, it is not always a reliable measure of
intra-industry safety progress. 216 In this regard, there is no dispute that, pre-
1969, the flat trend in fatality rates per miner diverged substantially from the
steep downward trend in coal miner fatalities in absolute numbers.21 7 The di-
vergence suggests that the fatalities per 100,000 miners rate did not accurately
capture the safety progress in the coal mining industry.
Although it has not been studied, it is likely that the unfavorable trend
in fatalities per 100,000 miners pre-1969 and the favorable trend in fatalities per
100,000 miners post-1969 primarily reflect changes in coal production and/or
productivity. In this regard, Neumann and Nelson noted that "output per man-
hour is significantly lower in the post-1970 period." In 1983, Sider also found a
"severe" decline in productivity post-1969 and only a "small and statistically
insignificant negative decline in accidents." 218
Thus, the better measure of mine safety progress is the fatalities per mil-
lion tons rate, as suggested by Braithwaite. 219 The fatalities per million tons rate
212 Boden's use of a model designed to study felonious criminal behavior is not appropriate to
study safety regulation enforcement since safety regulation enforcement is primarily directed at
negligent behaviors, not intentional ones. See generally Leslie I. Boden, Government Regulations
of Occupational Safety: Underground Coal Mine Accidents 1973-75, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 497
(1985).
213 Kniesner, supra note 211, at 84.
214 Id. at 97.
215 Ruffennach, supra note 5, at 15-17.
216 See Maury Gittleman & Brooks Pierce, A Different Approach to Measuring Workplace
Safety: Injuries and Fatalities Relative to Output, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, July 26, 2006,
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/sh20060724ar0 I pi.htm.
217 MSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NUMBER OF FATALITIES AND FATALITY RATES IN THE MINING
INDUSTRY BY COMMODITY, 1931-2005, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nioshlmininglstatistics/pdfs/f-hist-l.pdf.
218 Sider, supra note 38, at 225-33.
219 BRArHWArrE, supra note 59, at 176.
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directly compares coal mine output to coal mine fatalities. As such, it is the
best measure for those who have the dual concerns of energy policy and miner
safety. In this regard, Sider has reported that injuries per million tons of coal
mined "fell during the 1960s but rose quite rapidly during the 1970s.,,220 The
implication is that the actual impact of the 1969 Coal Act on mine safety was
unfavorable.
Thus, neither MSHA's own analysis nor the limited available empirical
studies reliably support the conclusion that forced-compliance has provided a
measurable net safety benefit. The absolute best thing that can be said about the
benefits of the forced-compliance approach is that they are unknown.
B. Certain Costs
While the benefit of forced-compliance has never been established, the
cost of forced-compliance is undisputable. Although not all of the costs have
been quantified and measured, the costs certainly do exist.
The most obvious cost of forced-compliance is MSHA's budget.
MSHA's total budget for fiscal year 2008 is $313.5 million.22' Seventy percent
of the budget, about $215 million, was committed to the agency's forced-
compliance function. MSHA collected $75 million in penalties in calendar year
2007 across all mining industries. Essentially, the net cost of MSHA's en-
forcement program to taxpayers is around $140 million.222 One way to look at
this amount is that taxpayers spend $3,120 to find just one condition that might
be reasonably expected to lead to an injury at a mine.223
In addition to the cost of enforcement borne by taxpayers, there is also a
more substantial, but harder to quantify, cost on mine operators. There is no
estimate of the industry's total cost of complying with MSHA's coal regula-
tions. As stated above, most MSHA rules pre-date the requirements for cost-
benefit analysis. The costs of compliance with MSHA's regulations are very
substantial. 224 The total industry-wide costs are certainly measured in billions of
220 Sider, supra note 38, at 16.
221 News Release from U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Public Affairs, FY 2008 Proposal
to Boost Funding for U.S. Dep't of Labor's MSHA by 13 Percent Over Current Funding Level to
$313.5 Million (February 5, 2006), available at
http://www.msha.gov/media/press/2007/nrO70205.pdf.
222 The $140 million figure is under-estimated to the extent that it does not include amounts in
the Department of Labor's budget, including the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission, or MSHA's administrative costs. The number is over-estimated to the extent that it in-
cludes amounts dedicated exclusively to health enforcement.
223 MINESAFETY AT A GLANCE, supra note 188 (author's calculation: $140 M/(144,735*.31)).
224 CNNMoney.com, supra note 188 ("Patriot Coal recently told Wall Street analysts that
MSHA enforcement has increased costs as much as $1.25 per ton. In the second quarter, for in-
stance, Patriot's per ton costs jumped more than 8.6 percent.").
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dollars.225 For example, just the three new rules following the Sago disaster226
are conservatively estimated by MSHA to cost the coal mining industry over
$100 million annually: $45 million for seals, 227 $41 million for refuge cham-
228 229bers,228 and $18 million for emergency mine evacuation.
It is worth mentioning that not all of the compliance costs associated
with MSHA regulations should be attributed to the forced-compliance model.
In a free market, mine operators would meet some of the regulatory require-
ments voluntarily. For example, following the Sago disaster, some underground
coal mine operators may have purchased refuge chambers to lower risk premi-
ums that may have risen due to changed perceptions about mining risks after the
disaster. Thus, the cost of a regulation should primarily include the class of
actions that would not be taken unless compelled by law.
The cost of abating citations would certainly be one component of this
class. Every citation issued by MSHA represents a difference of opinion be-
tween the government and the operator as to how capital should be allocated.
The existence of a citable condition in a mine implies that the operator did not
perceive the condition as posing a serious risk to safe production. Notably, it
can be inferred that MSHA agrees with the operator's implied determinations
most of the time from the fact that about 60% of the violations issued by MSHA
are designated not reasonably likely to result in a serious injury.23° One of the
greatest ironies of the Mine Act is that the operator is still required to immedi-
ately divert resources from safe production to abatement of each and every one
of the alleged violations, even though there is an admittedly minimal potential
for an injury avoidance benefit.
In addition to abatement, the other costs of noncompliance are also
worth mentioning. Coal operators paid $53 million in penalties to MSHA in
225 Joseph M. Johnson, A Review and Synthesis of the Cost of Workplace Regulation (Mercatus
Center, Geo. Mason U., Working Paper, Aug. 30, 2001); JOSEPH M. JOHNSON, A REVIEW AND
SYNTHESIS OF THE COST OF WORKPLACE REGULATIONS 21 (George Mason Univ. 2001) (estimating
2001 costs associated with Mine Act regulations at $7.4 billion).
226 The new belt air rule adopted in large part as a response to the Aracoma disaster is estimated
at $52 million annually, which is in addition to the 100 million in annual costs attributable to
changes after Sago. See Safety Standards Regarding the Recommendations of the Technical
Study Panel on the Utilization of Belt Air and the Composition and Fire Retardant Properties of
Belt Material in Underground Coal Mining, 73 Fed. Reg. 119, 35046 (June 19, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 30 C.F.R. pts. 6, 14, 18, 48, 75).
227 Sealing of Abandoned Areas, 73 Fed. Reg. 76, 21182, 21204 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified
at 30 C.F.R. pt. 75).
228 Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines, 73 Fed. Reg. 116, 34165 (June 16, 2008)
(to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 7, 75).
229 Emergency Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. 41, 12251 (March 9, 2006) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 75).
230 MINE SAFETY AT A GLANCE, supra note 188; see also INTERNAL REVIEW supra note 49, at
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calendar year 2007.231 The more significant noncompliance costs result from
the diversion of resources from production, which are associated with closure
orders and with accompanying and accommodating MSHA inspectors during
inspections. Operators also incur costs, including legal fees, when they contest
MSHA violations. The real and opportunity costs associated with litigating over
"shades of gray" should not be underestimated.232
It is important to emphasize that the costs imposed on mine operators
are ultimately transferred to consumers.233 Contrary to popular perception, the
costs are not distributed to the shareholders of mining companies. Because most
coal is used for electrical generation, the consumers typically pay the price of
forced-compliance in the form of higher electricity costs. Neither the amount of
these costs nor their impact on individual consumers has been estimated.
C. Negative Net Value
Given that there are uncertain benefits and certain costs, it is certainly
fair to ask whether the forced-compliance approach is worth continuing. Al-
though advocates of forced-compliance shy away from the cost-benefit analysis,
the almost certain cost-ineffectiveness of the Mine Act imposes potentially tre-
mendous opportunity costs on society.
Advocates of forced-compliance have suggested that the burden should
be on the critics of the regulatory approach to prove that the forced-compliance
of mine safety regulations is not cost-effective.234 Of course, a reverse burden
of proof is contrary to modem practice, whereby the regulator is required to
assess the cost benefit of a rule prior to its promulgation. 235 In the case of the
Mine Act, a reverse burden of proof also gives Nixon-era decisions the benefit
of the doubt, even though there was no science underlying those decisions. This
essentially creates a conundrum whereby society is perpetually bound by ques-
tionable policy decisions made in the 1970s. It is more appropriate to put the
231 MINE SAFETY AT A GLANCE, supra note 188.
232 Testimony of William G. Miles, Director of Loss Control, Newmont Gold Co., Elko, Ne-
vada: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Con. (1998), avail-
able at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedwp5-137.000/hedwp5-137.htm ("[A]fter
three years and nearly a million dollars in legal defense fees, MSHA's unjustified policy change
remains pending before the MSHA review Commission.")
233 See BRArTHWAITE, supra note 59 at 165 ("We have seen that in the United States, fines are.
. generally passed on in higher energy costs to the community as a de facto royalty on the cost of
each ton of coal."); see also supra note 224.
234 See Alison Morantz, Mining Mining Data: What Empirical Analysis Can Tell Us
About Coal Mine Safety Regulation, Thinking Outside the Box: A Post-Sago Look at Coal Mine
Safety, http://lawschoolcoalconference.event.wvu.edu/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (symposium
webcast available).
235 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997), available at http:/Iwww.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/chap I .html.
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burden of proof on those who want to continue the appropriation of finite public
resources for private causes.
Regardless of whether the advocates or the critics of forced-compliance
bear the burden of proof, the evidence is mounting that forced-compliance with
mine safety laws is not serving society's interest. Kniesner and Leeth, men-
tioned above, attempted to measure the cost-effectiveness of MSHA's enforce-
ment activities. Using the highest values of life and injury and the least possible
cost of an inspection, Kniesner and Leeth estimated that the cost of eliminating
one injury through MSHA enforcement is $463,966.236 Given that the benefit
from eliminating an injury is estimated at $219,443, Kniesner and Leeth con-
cluded that the "implied cost/benefit ratio for the most favorable case we can
construct for MSHA is about 2.1 > 1." 237 They further estimated that the cost
of eliminating one fatality through additional MSHA enforcement activities is a
staggering $100,865,530.238 Put in the context of additional enforcement re-
quired, "the cost of eliminating one fatality would then be $1.17 billion, which
is over 10 times the annual enforcement budget., 239 In terms of opportunity
costs, Kniesner and Leeth concluded "moving $27.5 million from the MSHA
enforcement budget into more heart disease screening or defibrillators would
gain on balance 687,489 life years for the affected population, which is equiva-
lent to about 39,700 statistical miners' lives. 240
It is important to emphasize that Kniesner and Leeth only evaluated the
direct costs of enforcement borne by taxpayers and not the additional cost of
regulation borne by consumers. The compliance and noncompliance costs also
present tremendous opportunity costs on society as well. For example, anecdo-
tal accounts of the elderly and poor not turning on air conditioners during heat
waves for fear of higher electric bills suggest just one possible opportunity cost
that may be associated with the forced-compliance of mine safety regulation.241
Perhaps the 30 heat related deaths mentioned at the beginning of the article
could have been avoided with lower electricity costs. Just like mine operators,
society is not immune from the potential for adverse consequences of risk-for-
risk trade-offs. Therefore, prudence and caution dictate a full accounting of the
costs and benefits of forced-compliance of mine safety regulations before the
expenditure of finite public resources is permitted to continue.
236 Kniesner, supra note 211, at 102.
237 Id.
238 Kniesner, supra note 211, at 103.
239 Id.
240 Kniesner, supra note 211, at 105.
241 See generally Hector Becerra, Tami Abdollah, & Carla Hall, For Heat's Victims, a Quiet
Death, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007 at A-1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/0611ocallme-deaths6 ("When your electricity costs as much as
your food does, and that's the only amount of money you have coming in, a lot of people around
here choose to eat rather than to stay cool.")
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XI. CONCLUSION
The Sago mine disaster shows that lawyers do not and cannot make
mines safer. Command and control regulation is simply the wrong tool for the
job. Central planning and periodic government oversight are too cumbersome
for a dynamic industry like mining where conditions change by the minute. The
preoccupation with meting out minor punishments for subjective infractions
only serves to diminish the government's important role in developing and dis-
tributing safety-related information. Ultimately, it is information, in the hands
of self-interested individuals in the mining industry, that makes mining safer.
The government should trust that the freely made decisions of informed miners
and mine operators, in the aggregate, will fairly and accurately reflect society's
strong preference for safe coal mines.
42
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/8
